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GANG LOITERING AND RACE
LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL"
When the United States Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Morales that Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinanceauthorizing the police to disperse groups of loiterers containing
criminal street gang members2 --was unconstitutionally vague,
Harvey Grossman, the attorney who had argued the case for the
winning side, called the decision "a victory for 'young men of
Deputy Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago Department of Law. This article is
the work of a partisan. I have been in law enforcement in Chicago for over sixteen
years, both in my present position and previously as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. I was involved in the drafting and defense of
Chicago's original anti-gang loitering ordinance, and argued on behalf of the City of
Chicago in defense of the ordinance before the United States Supreme Court in 01)
of Chicago v. Moraes. I also participated in the drafting of the new anti-gang loitering
ordinance recently enacted by the Chicago City Council. The views expressed in this
article are nevertheless my own and should not be attributed to the City of Chicago or
its Department of Law. I must acknowledge a deep debt to the extraordinary group
that have helped me to fashion this article. From academia, I must thank Dan Kahan,
Debra Livingston, Tracey Meares, Geoffrey Stone, and David Strauss, who commented on drafts of this article and, in innumerable conversations, have been of immense help in enabling me to crystallize my own views. I was also enormously aided
by the comments of a number of present and former prosecutors whom I consulted,
including Scott Mendeloff, Norma Reyes, and Ronald Safer, as well as Deputy Superintendent of Police Harvey Radney, whose wisdom on the subject of gang crime I
have found invaluable. I also am indebted to my colleague Benna Solomon and my
spouse, Kate Sachnoff, for their comments and advice on earlier drafts, and, in Kate's
case, for her indulgence during the many months that I worked on the article. I must
also thank for their valuable suggestions the Research Fellows of the American Bar
Association who participated in a seminar in which an earlier version of this article
was presented.
527 U.S. 41 (1999).
The ordinance provided: "Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he
reasonably believes to be a member of a criminal street gang loitering in any public
place with one or more other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and
remove themselves from the area." "Loiter" was defined as "to remain in any one
place with no apparent purpose." Anyone who did not "promptly obey" an order to
disperse was subject to a fine of between $100 and $500 or imprisonment of up to six
months, or both, and could also be required to perform up to 120 hours community
service in addition to or instead of the fine and imprisonment. Id. at 47 n.2.
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color.' ' 3 That may seem a strange thing to say about a case in

which no claim of racial discrimination was made by the parties
or passed upon by the Court,4 but Mr. Grossman's reaction was
far from idiosyncratic. Questions of racial fairness are consistently raised
5 by the critics of anti-loitering and other public order laws.
Dorothy Roberts, for example, sees the Court's
holding in Morales as reflecting a concern about the risk of racial bias in the enforcement of public order laws.6 Under Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance, she contends, the
potential for police abuse was especially high: "With no criminal conduct to go by, police officers probably used race as a
critical factor in judging whether an individual might be a gang
member., 7 The inevitable racial friction that this type of law will
produce, Professor Roberts argues, reinforces patterns of racial
subjugation.8 David Cole makes a similar argument and adds
that when minorities perceive this type of unfairness in the
criminal justice system they "have less incentive to play by the
rules, and accordingly, double standards in law enforcement actually contribute to criminal conduct in those neighborhoods

' Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Strikes Anti-LoiteringOrdinance;Law Aimed At GangsIs
Called Too Vague, WASH. PosT, June 11, 1999, at Al.
The Court held that the ordinance was fatally vague because it granted police officers effectively unchecked discretion to determine what types of activities constituted "loitering" within the meaning of the ordinance. See 527 U.S. at 60-64. Four
justices also expressed concerns about whether the ordinance supplied individuals
with sufficient notice of what conduct it regulated. See id. at 56-60 (plurality opinion);
id. at 69-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights? A Response To Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. Cm. LEG. F. 215; David
Cole, Foreword:Discretion and DiscriminationReconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal
Justice Scholarship,87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999); Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject:
A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and
Order-MaintenancePolicing New York Style, 97 MIcH. L. REv. 291 (1998); Randall Kennedy, Guilty By Association, AM. PROSPECT, May-June 1997, at 66; Toni Massaro, The
Gang's Not Here, 2 GREEN BAG 25 (1998); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword:Race, Vagueness,
and the Social Meaningof Order-MaintenancePolicing,89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775
(1999). See also Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249 (1998); Matthew Mickle
Werdegar, Note, Enjoiningthe Constitution:The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against UrbanStreet Gangs,51 STAN. L. REV. 409 (1999).
See Roberts, supranote 5, at 786-87, 799, 804-10.
Id. at 806.
See id. at 811-18.
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that are already most at risk of criminal behavior for socioeconomic reasons."9
The decision in Morales makes the questions raised by Professors Roberts and Cole even more urgent. The Court found
the ordinance vague because it permitted enforcement against
loiterers engaged in entirely "innocent" activities, but added
that a law directed at loitering by groups containing gang members would sufficiently limit enforcement discretion "if the ordinance only applied to loitering that had an apparently
harmful purpose or effect... ."'o Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer, added that an antigang loitering law should be upheld if it defined loitering as "to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose other than
to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others
from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities.""
Thus, the Court appears to have endorsed anti-loitering laws
Cole, supra note 5, at 1091.
,0527 U.S. at 62 (footnote omitted). An anti-loitering law limited to conduct with
a harmful purpose or effect would also appear to resolve the concerns of a threejustice plurality about the adequacy of notice. The plurality reasoned that the order
to disperse which was required under the ordinance failed to provide constitutionally
appropriate notice because "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the
dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty." Id. at 58. See also id. at
69-70 (KennedyJ, concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment). Confining a
law to loitering with a harmful purpose or effect, then, would appear to solve this
problem. To be sure, the plurality raised additional concerns about the sufficiency of
notice because the ordinance did not specify how far and for how long loiterers must
disperse, but the plurality acknowledged that "[flack of clarity in the description of a
loiterer's duty to obey a dispersal order might not render the ordinance unconstitutionally vague if the definition of the forbidden conduct were clear ....
" Id. at 59-60.
To the extent that greater precision is required to detailing the obligation to disperse,
that should prove no serious obstacle to the next generation of anti-loitering laws. In
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court upheld a statute prohibiting demonstrations "near" a courthouse, "at least as applied to a demonstration within the sight
and hearing of those in the courthouse." Id. at 568. It should follow that an ordinance directing the police to order loiterers to remove themselves from within sight
and hearing of the location from which they have been ordered to leave will readily
pass muster.
" 527 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor observed that had the ordinance been construed by the
state courts to embody this standard, it should have been upheld: "Such a definition
would be consistent with the Chicago City Council's findings and would avoid the
vagueness problems of the ordinance as construed by the Illinois Supreme Court."
Id. Justice O'Connor's view likely commands a majority of the Court, since it is consistent with the views of theJustices who would have upheld the ordinance. See id. at
89-95 (Scalia,J., dissenting); id. at 106-11 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
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when loitering has an "apparently harmful purpose or effect"; a
standard for judging loitering laws far more lenient than can be
Chicago has taken the Court's
found in prior precedents.'
hint. The Chicago City Council recently enacted a new antgang loitering ordinance that authorizes police officers to order
groups containing members of criminal street gangs to disperse
The new ordiwhen they are engaged in "gang loitering.
nance defines "gang loitering" as "remaining in any one place
under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to
believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a
criminal street gang to establish control over identifiable areas,
to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities."' 4 The new ordinance also defines "criminal
street gang" in terms that track the federal racketeering statute's
definition of "racketeering activity."' 5 The City Council enacted
a companion anti-drug loitering measure as well.'
While narrower than the original anti-gang loitering ordinance, these revised measures nevertheless provide a potent
prophylactic policing tool: they authorize dispersal orders
whenever the police reasonably believe that gang or drug activity is afoot. Indeed, a nationwide trend seems to be underway to
enact anti-loitering laws as part of the movement toward com" For a comprehensive account of state of the law prior to Morales, see Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities,
and the New Policing,97 COLUM. L. REV. 551,595-650 (1997).
" CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015(c) (1) (rev. 2000). The full text of this
provision is:
Whenever a police officer observes a member of a criminal street gang engaged in gang
loitering with one or more other persons in any public place designated for the enforcement of this Section under subsection (b), the police officer shall, subject to all applicable
procedures promulgated by the superintendent of police: (i) inform all such persons that
they are engaged in gang loitering within an area in which loitering by groups containing
criminal street gang members is prohibited; (ii) order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from within sight and hearing of the place at which the order was issued;
and (iii) inform those persons that they will be subject to arrest if they fail to obey the order promptly or engage in further gang loitering within sight or hearing of the place at
which the order was issued during the next three hours.

Id. § 8-4-015(a).
"Id. at § 8-4-015(d) (1).
" Compare id. § 8-4-015(d) (2) with 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
2" The anti-drug loitering ordinance authorizes dispersal orders when individuals
"remain []in any one place under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to facilitate the distribution of substances in violation of the Cannabis Control Act or the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act." CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIi'AL CODE § 8-4-017(c) (1) (rev. 2000).
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munity-oriented and order-maintenance policing.Y And because laws drafted to comply with the Morales decision are likely
to withstand attack on other grounds, future debate on the fairness of public order laws is likely to focus on whether they can
be fairly applied to racial minorities.'8
To date, the debate over public order laws has largely been
framed in terms of the supposed virtues and vices of order
maintenance as a policing strategy. The advocates of public order laws argue that visible disorder in a community stimulates
the commission of more serious crimes,' 9 and that a policing
strategy based on order maintenance is of particular benefit in
inner-city minority communities, where social disorder is a particularly serious problem. 2 Critics of public order laws take the
opposite tack; they question the relationship between disorder

" See DirkJohnson, Chicago Tries Anew With Anti-Gang Ordinance,N.Y. TmIES, Feb.
22, 2000, at A14. See also Livingston, supranote 12, at 573-91.
" For similar assessments of the extent to which the decision in Morales permits
state and local governments to enact new public order laws, see, eg., Craig M. Bradley, The ChangingFace of Criminal Procedure,TRIAL, Oct. 1999, at 84; Dan M. Kahan &
Tracey L. Meares, Public-OrderPolicingCan Pass ConstitutionalMuster, WALL ST. J., June
15, 1999, at A18; Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering; The Court, and Some Realism About
PolicePatro 1999 Sup. CT. REv. 141, 190-91; Erik Luna, ConstitutionalRoad Maps, 90J.
CRM. L. & CRImOLOGY 1125, 1134-49 (2000); Mark Tushnet, TheSupreme Court, 1998
Term-Foreword: The New ConstitutionalOrder and the Chastening of ConstitutionalAsprration, 113 HAav. L. REv. 29, 93-94 (1999); Note, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading
Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 200, 285-86 (1999); Note, Angela L. Clark, City of Chicago v.
Morales: SacrificingIndividual Liberty Interestsfor Community Safety, 31 LOY. U.C. Lj.
113, 144-47 (1999); Note, Matt Wawrzyn, Chicago v. Morales: ConstitutionalPrinciplesat
Loggerheadswith Community Action, 50 DEPAUL L RE%. 371, 411-18 (2000).
" The classic statement of this policing theory is the "Broken Windows" thesis.
which argues that signs of visible disorder in the streetscape stimulate the commission
of more serious crime. SeeJames Q. Wilson & George L Kelling, Bro.en Vindows,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 31-38. See also, e.g., GEORGE L. KELLING &
CATHERINE M. COLES, FDXNG BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING
CRm EIN OUR COMiUNITIES 71-107 (1996); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE
9-10, 51-57, 7-75, 85-124 (1990);JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CoM~tJNriy POuCING: ISSUES AND PRACTICES AROUND THE WORLD 4-19

(1988).
" See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L Meares, Foreword." The Coming Crisis of CriminalProcedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) [hereinafter cited as "Kahan & Meares, The Coming
Crisis"]; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrenco, 83 VA. L REV.
349 (1997); Tracey L Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking. A Critiqueof Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Cm1. LEG. F. 197 [hereinafter cited
as "Meares & Kahan, Wages"]; Tracey L. Meares, Social Organizationand DrugLaw Enforcement, 35 At. CRI,. L. REv. 191 (1998).

LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL

[Vol. 91

and crime, 2' and argue that the police are likely to unfairly target persons of color as "disorderly."22 Largely missing from this
debate, however, is an effort to evaluate public order laws in
light of the considerable research that has been done in the past
few decades on the ecology of the inner city. That research, I
will argue, suggests a different kind of case to be made on behalf of public order laws.
Thus, in an effort to advance the debate over public order
laws, I will focus not on the controversial relationship between
disorder and crime, but on the ecology of the inner city. In particular, I intend to focus on the work identifying an inner-city,
disproportionately minority "underclass," and on the implications of that concept for crime control. Underclass theorists assert that as a consequence of structural changes in the economy,
coupled with the continuing effects of racism, an "underclass"
has emerged that faces much more restricted opportunities for
upward
mobility than existed in the urban slums of earlier
23
eras.
I focus on the concept of an "underclass" not only because it has such wide acceptance among students of the inner
city, but also because it sheds so much light on the racial dimension of inequality in America. Underclass theory's special value
lies in its ability to explain why the traditional vehicles for upward mobility have failed so many inner-city minorities. There
have been insufficient attempts, however, to apply the teachings
of underclass theory to criminal justice policy, and, in particular, to gang crime, the particular form of lawlessness that most
profoundly affects inner-city underclass communities.
This effort to consider the implications of underclass theory
for inner-city gang crime begins with the evidence showing the
See, e.g., Harcourt, supranote 5, at 308-42.
See, e.g., Cole, supranote 5, at 1074-82; Roberts, supra note 5, at 803-10.
" I use the term "underclass" in the sense that it has been employed by William
Julius Wilson, the leading academic expositor of this concept. Professor Wilson has
used this term to describe the impoverished residents of inner-city, predominantly
minority communities inhabited by large numbers of persons lacking significant
training and skills and who have experienced long-term unemployment; street criminals; and families that experience lengthy periods of poverty and reliance on welfare.
See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,

THE TRULY

DISADVANTAGED:

THE INNER

CITY, THE

PUBLIC POLICY 7-8 (1987). Most other scholars use the term in simiSee, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY,

UNDERCLASS, AND

lar ways.

AND THE UNDERCLASS 144-49 (1992); Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty
in the United States, 1970-1980, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 235-39 (Christopher Jencks

& Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) [hereinafter cited as "THE URBAN UNDERCLASS"].
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dimensions of the problem that gang crime poses for the inner
city. The emergence of entrenched criminal street gangs, I will
then argue, is the natural consequence of the emergence of an
entrenched urban underclass.24 Gang crime in an underclass
community has a predictable pattern, resulting in a thoroughly
destabilized and demoralized community in which drug trafficking comes to be seen as one of the few economic opportunities
available. Unless rampant gang criminality in underclass neighborhoods is curbed, the ability of other social and economic
policies to ameliorate the plight of underclass communities is at
best limited. I will also argue that an anti-loitering strategy is a
vehicle for attacking conditions conducive to the success of
street gangs without relying on mass incarceration strategies
that impose enormously disproportionate burdens on minorities. From the standpoint of racial fairness, I will contend that
the use of public order laws is preferable to conventional law
enforcement strategies, both because public order laws address
conditions that facilitate the success of inner-city gangs through
relatively moderate police tactics, and because they are less susceptible to police abuse than the tactics that they replace.
The approach to criminal justice policy taken here long ago
went out of fashion. In this era of harshly punitive criminal laws
based on theories of retribution and deterrence, an effort to
identify the root causes of inner-city crime may seem to many
beside the point. But in my view, it is time for a rigorous reassessment of criminal justice policy in light of all that we have
learned about the sociology and political economy of the inner
city in the last thirty years-an inquiry rarely undertaken in the
debate over public order laws. If poverty and racism are at the
root of inner city crime, then the fairness of the harshly punitive
" When I refer to the term "gang," I reference the concept as it is employed by the
Chicago Police Department-an association of individuals that exhibits in varying degrees four characteristics: a gang name and recognizable symbols, a geographic territory, a regular meeting pattern, and an organized, continuing course of criminality.
See IL. CRaj. JusncE INF. AuTH., REsFARcH BULETIN: STEET GANGS AND CRIMEPATRNAS AND TRENDS IN CHXcAGo 2 (Sep. 1996). I will also refer to Chicago Police

Department statistics for gang-related crime. The Chicago Police Department defines
an offense as gang related when the preponderance of the evidence reflects a gangrelated motivation. See id. at 2-3. This is a particularly stringent test, since it is
unsatisfied merely by evidence that the victim or offender has a gang affiliation,
which is the approach utilized in mostjurisdictions. See Cheryl L Maxson & Malcolm
W. Klein, Defining Gang Homicide, in GANGS IN AMERICA 6 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 1996
ed.) [hereinafter cited as "GANGS IN AiMERiCA 1996 ED."].
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regime reflected in current criminal justice policy--especially as
represented by drug trafficking laws-is properly open to question. The sociology and political economy of the inner city also
suggests, however, that if law enforcement is given no role to
play in suppressing inner city crime, it is naive to think innercity communities can be revitalized. Public order laws, I will
suggest, can serve the twin goals of promoting racial fairness
and revitalizing the inner city.
I. THE MAGNITUDE OF GANG CRIME

Reliable statistics on gang membership and gang crime are
hard to come by--there is no generally accepted methodology
for identifying gangs, gang members, or gang-related crime.
Yet there is little genuine doubt that the problem of gang crime
is of considerable proportion. The National Youth Gang Survey, a
United States Department of Justice survey of law enforcement
agencies nationwide, estimated that in 1998 there were 28,700
gangs in the United States with 780,200 members. 26 A survey of
seventy-nine large and forty-three small-sized cities in the early
1990s found 249,324 gang members, 4,881 gangs, 46,359 gangrelated crimes, and 1,072 gang-related homicides within a seventeen-month period. 27 The Los Angeles County Sheriff has estimated that Los Angeles County alone contains more than
1,200 gangs with more than 150,000 members.28 The United
Z

See, e.g., HERBERT C. COVEY, SCOTT MENARD & ROBERT J.

GANGS 3-13 (2d ed.

1997); G.

FRANZESE, JUVENILE

DAVID CURRY & SCOTT H. DECKER, CONFRONTING GANGS:

CRIME AND COMMUNITY 2-6 (1998). For example, the United States Department of
Justice's National Youth Gang Survey leaves it to each responding law enforcement
agency to decide for itself what it is willing to classify as a "gang," excluding motorcycle gangs, hate or ideology groups, prison gangs, and exclusively adult gangs. See

OFFICE OFJUVENILEJUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 1998
NATIONAL YOUTH GANG SURVEY: SUMMARY 6 (Dec. 2000) (hereinafter cited as "1998
NATIONALYOUTH GANG SURVEY"].

" See id. at 12. The Survey reported that 60 percent of gang members were adults
and 40 percent werejuveniles. See id. at 14-15. Law enforcement agencies in large cities and suburban counties reported a higher average proportion of adult gang members, id. at 15, and the average percentage of adult gang members increased
substantially as the population of the reporting jurisdiction increased. Id. 15-16. Females accounted for 8 percent of gang members and female membership was lowest
in large cities. Id. at 17.
" See G. DAVID CURRY, RICHARD A. BALL & ROBERTJ. Fox, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
GANG CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT RECORDKEEPING (Aug. 1994).
" See Gangs:A National Crisis: Hearingon S.54 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay,
105th Cong., 51 (April 23, 1997) (statement ofJames Mulvihill).
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States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois has estimated that Chicago alone has some 125 street gangs with more
than 100,000 members.2 This assessment of the magnitude of
the gang problem is not confined to surveys of law enforcement
agencies. For example, surveys have found that anywhere from
5 to 10 p ercent of all public school students claim gang membership. A 1995 survey reported that 28 percent of students
ages 12-19 reported gangs at their schools (up from 15 percent
in 1989); the figure was 41 percent for students in central cities
(up from 25 percent in 1989).3
With gangs comes violent crime. The National Youth Gang
Survey reported that in 1997 there were 3,340 homicides involving gang2 members, and 1,880 homicides involving gang-related
motives. This means that gangs were involved in 18 percent of
all homicides nationwide.
While reliable statistics are not
available to evaluate trends in gang-related homicide, "levels of
youth homicide remain considerably higher than those of the
early and mid-1980's." And there is little evidence that gang
activity is declining along with the overall crime rate; the 1998
See U.S. Attorney's Office, N.D. Ill., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Anti-Violent Crime Initiative Fact Sheet for the Northern District of Illinois (1996) (unpublished release on
file with author).
'

See IRVINGJA. SPERGEL, THEYoumH GANG PROBLEM: A COMMUNrIYAPPROACH 31-33

(1995).
" See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS & BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND
SAFETY: 1999 32-33 (Sep. 1999). See also BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STUDENTS' REPORTS OF SCHOOL CRIME: 1989 AND 1995 8-9 (Apr. 1998). This

data is based only on the proportion of students responding affirmatively when asked
if there were street gangs at their school. When the data was reexamined for a
broader measure of gang presence, including respondents who stated that gang
members attended their schools or that gang members have been around their
schools within the past six months, 37 percent of all students answered affirmatively,
and over 50 percent of students residing in cities with a population of more than
50,000 answered affirmatively. SeeJAhmS C. HOWELL & JAMES P. LYNH, U.S. DEP'T OF
JusTIcE, YOUTH GANGS IN SCHOOLS 2, 3-4 (Aug. 2000).
" OFFICE OFJUVENILEJUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUS-ICE.
1997 NATIONAL YOUTH GANG SURVEY SUMMARY 15 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter cited as
"1997 NATIONALYouTH GANG SURVEY"]. The survey found a statistically significant re-

lationship between the reporting jurisdiction's population and the rate of gang
homicide. See id. at 16. The 1998 Survey did not attempt to estimate the number of
gang-related homicides. See 1998 NATIONALYOUTH GANG SURVEY, npra note 25, at 26.
1997 NATIONALYOUEH GANG SURVEY, supra note 32, at 15.
m JAEs ALAN Fox

&

MARIANNE W. ZAwrz,

TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES:

U.S.

DEP"T OF JUSTICE, HO.ICIDE

1998 UPDATE 2 (Mar. 2000).
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Survey reported that 42 percent of responding jurisdictions believed that their gang problem was staying about the same, 28
percent felt it was worsening, and 30 percent felt that it was improving.35
There is wide agreement among scholars that the rate of
violent crime among gang members is much higher than the
rate of violent crime among other delinquent youth. 6 There is
also general agreement that the level of gang violence has escalated dramatically in recent decades.3 ' And the rate at which
gang-related violent crime results in fatalities has also risen in
recent years-a fact that gang researchers attribute to the increasing availability of high-powered handguns.38 This rising
5 See 1998 NATIONALYOUTH GANG SURVEY, supranote 25, at 14. There is also some
reason to believe that gang-related homicide has not declined as fast as the overall
homicide rate in recent years. Among cities with populations in excess of 25,000 that
reported gang problems and gang homicides from 1996 through 1998, 49 percent
reported a decrease in gang-related homicides, 15 percent reported no change, and
36 percent reported an increase. See id.
at 26-27.
See SARA R. BATIN-PEARSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GANG MEMBERSHIP,
DELINQUENT PEERS, AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR 3-4, 5-8 (Oct. 1998); COvEY, MENARD &

FRANZESE, supra note 25, at 35-37; CURRY & DECKER, supra note 25, at 55-58; JAMES C.
HOWELL, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, YOUTH GANGS: AN OVERVIEW 9-10 (April 1998); C.
RONALD HUFF,U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPARING THE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUTH
GANGS AND AT-RISKYOUTHS 4 (Oct. 1998); MALCOLM W. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET
GANG: ITS NATURE, PREVALENCE, AND CONTROL 112-16 (1995); SPERGEL, supra note 30,

at 40-42; C. Ronald Huff, The Criminal Behavior of Gang Members and Nongang At-Risk
Youth, in GANGS IN AMERICA 1996 ED., supra note 24, at 83-87; Sara R. Battin et al., The
Contribution of Gang Membership To Delinquency Beyond Delinquent Friends, 36
CRIMINOLOGY 93 (1998); Terence B. Thornberry et al., The Role ofJuvenile Gangs in FacilitatingDelinquentBehavior, 30J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 55 (1993).
" See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: A
COORDINATED APPROACH TO THE CHALLENGE OF GANG VIOLENCE: A PROGRESS REPORT 1

(April 1996); KLEIN, supra note 36, at 90-99; SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 34-36; Jeffrey
Fagan, Gangs, Drugs, and Neighborhood Change, in GANGS IN AMERICA 1996 ED., supra
note 24, at 44-46; Walter B. Miller, Why The United States Has Failed To Solve Its Youth
Gang Problem, in GANGS IN AMERICA 263 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 1990 ed.) [hereinafter
cited as "GANGS IN AMERICA 1990 ED."].
"

See, e.g., COVEY, MENARD & FRANzESE, supra note 25, at 46-48; HOWELL, supra note

36, at 10; SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 35-36; Fagan, supra note 37, at 45. See also Beth
Bjerregaard & Alan J. Lizotte, Gun Ownership and Gang Membership, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 37 (1995).

See generally TOM DIAz, MAIING A KILLING: THE BUSINESS OF

GUNS IN AMERICA 91-105 (1999).

For example, in Chicago, between 1987 and 1994

firearms were used in 96 percent of all gang-related homicides, and researchers at-

tribute the increased mortality rate of gang-related shootings during this period to
the increasing use of semi or fully automatic firearms than had been utilized in gangrelated shootings in prior years. SeeILL. CRIM.JUSTICE INF. AUTH., supra note 24, at 1617.
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level of gang violence, of course, has had a dramatic impact on
the character of gang-infested communities. As a United States
Department of Justice report observed: "Violent gangs are now
having a major impact on the quality of life of communities
throughout the nation. " 9
Perhaps the most repellent type of gang violence is the
drive-by shooting, favored by gang members when they mean to
attack rivals on their own turf, necessitating a quick approach
and getaway.4 Of course, it is not that easy to shoot someone
from a moving car. Consequently, drive-bys and other gangrelated shootings all too often injure innocent bystanders. For
example, between 1987 and 1994, of the 956 gang-related
homicides in Chicago, 138 of the victims were not gang members, and twelve victims were age nine or younger; non-gangmember victims were also disproportionately likely to be very
young or elderly and most frequently were shot as the result of
crossfire.4 ' A study of gang-related homicides in Los Angeles
found that half of the victims were not gang members. 2 This is
one of a number of characteristics of gang-related homicides
that make them especially destructive of a community's morale
and stability, as a recent Department ofJustice study concluded:
Homicides by gang members are more likely to take place in public
settings (particularly on the street), involve strangers and multiple participants, and involve automobiles (drive-by shootings). Gang homicides
are three times
more likely than nongang homicides to involve fear of
43
retaliation.

"
U.S. DEP'T OFJusr cE, supra note 37, at 1. See also CATHERINE H. Costv. U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, STREET GANGS: CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND STRATEGIES 12-13 (1993).
SeeJoAN W. MOORE, GOING DOWN TO THE BARRiO: HotEfo s AND HOMEGIRLS IN

CHANGE 60 (1991); Wnit.Ui

B. SANDERS, GANGBANGS AND DRn-Bv: GROUNDED
67-68 (1994). See also KLEIN, supra note 36. at
117-18; I-. CRMI.JUSTICE INF. AUTH., supra note 24, at 17-18.
" ILL. CRi.JusTICE INF. AUTH., supra note 24, at 13. For example:
In Chicago, an 11 year old boy sought to impress members of his gang by shooung at rival
gang members. He missed, instead killing a 14 year old girl and %ovunding two other bystanders. Four days later, he was executed for his mistake with two bullets to the head-by
his own gang members.
U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 37, at 1.
' C. Ronald Huff, Gangs in the United States, in THE GANG INTER%ENTION HANDBOOK
13 (Arnold P. Goldstein & C. Ronald Huff eds., 1993).
' HOWELL, supra note 36, at 10 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Gary W. Bailey & W.
Pradha Unnithan, Gang Homicides in California: A Discriminant Analysts, 22 J. CRLI.
CULTURE ANDJUvENILE GANGVIOLENCE
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But the form of criminal activity most closely identified with
criminal street gangs is drug trafficking.

The 1998 National

Youth Gang Survey found that reporting jurisdictions identified a
larger proportion of gang members involved in drug sales than
any other form of criminal activity and that 34 percent of all
gangs were considered "drug gangs."" Academic researchers relying on self-reporting by urban youth have also consistently reported heavy involvement of inner-city gangs in narcotics sales.45
JUSTICE 267 (1994); Malcolm W. Klein, Cheryl L. Maxson & Lea C. Cunningham,
"Crack," Street Gangs, and Violence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 623 (1991); Cheryl L. Maxson,

Morse A. Gordon & Malcolm W. Klein, Differences Between Gang and Nongang Homicide,
23 CRIMINOLOGY 209 (1985).
" See 1998 NATIONAL YOuTH GANG SURVEY, supra note 25, at 28, 33. See also, e.g.,
Gangs:A National Crisis:Hearingon S. 54 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 12-13 (1997) (statement of Steven R. Wiley, Chief of Violent Crimes and Major
Offender Section, FBI); The GangProblem in America:Formulatingan Effective FederalResponse: HearingBefore the Subcomm. onJuv.Just. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 103rd
Cong. 14-15 (1994) (statement ofJames C. Frier, Deputy Ass't Dir., FBI); AL VALDEZ,
GANGS: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING STREET GANGS 126-27, 233 (1997). Respondents
to the 1997 National Youth Gang Survey estimated that nationwide 42 percent of all
youth gangs were involved in the sale of drugs in order to generate profits for the
gang. See 1997 NATIONALYOUTH GANG SURVEY, supra note 32, at 22-23. In large cities,
the figure was 49 percent. See id. The 1997 Survey produced a nationwide estimate
that gang members conducted 33 percent of all crack cocaine sales, 32 percent of all
marijuana sales, 16 percent of all powder cocaine sales, 12 percent of all methamphetamine sales, and 9 percent of all heroin sales. See id. at 27-28.
" See, e.g., COvEY, MENARD & FRANZESE, supra note 25, at 51-54; Scorr H. DECKER &
BARRICK VAN WINKLE, LIFE IN THE GANG: FAMILY, FRIENDS AND VIOLENCE 153-71 (1996);
JOHN M. HAGEDORN, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME, AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A
RUSTBELT CITY 103-05 (1988); JAMES C. HOWELL & SCOTT H. DECKER, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE YOUTH GANGS, DRUGS, AND VIOLENCE CONNECTION 2-5, 7 (Jan. 1999);

HUFF, supra note 36, at 4, 7; MARTIN SANCHEZ JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET:
GANGS AND AMERICAN URBAN SOCIETY 120-21 (1991); JOAN W. MOORE, HOMEBOYS:
GANGS, DRUGS AND PRISON IN THE BARRIOS OF Los ANGELES 75-93 (1978); FELUX M.
PAD1LA, THE GANG AS AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 97-117, 129-51 (1993); CARL S. TAYLOR,
DANGEROUS SOCIETY 92, 97, 99 (1990); Huff, supra note 36, at 83-90; Ronald Glick,
Survival, Income, and Status: Drug Dealing in the Chicago Puerto Rican Community, in
DRUGS IN HISPANIC COMMUNrIES 77-101 (Ronald Glick & Joan Moore eds., 1990);
Jerome H. Skolnick, Ricky Bluthenal & Theodore Correl, Gang Organization and Migration, in GANGS: THE ORIGIN AND IMPACr OF CONTEMPORARY YOUTH GANGS IN THE
UNITED STATES 193-202 (Scott Cummings & DanielJ. Monti eds., 1993) [hereinafter
cited as "GANGS"]; Carl S. Taylor, Gang Imperialism, in GANGS IN AMERICA 1990 ED., supra note 37, at 10-15; Finn-Aage Esbensen & David Huizinga, Gangs, Drugs, and Delinquency in a Survey of Urban Youth, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 565, 573-75 (1993);Jeffrey Fagan,
The Social Organization of Drug Use and Drug Dealing Among Urban Gangs, 27
CRIM[INOLOGY 633, 635, 648-51 (1989) [hereinafter cited as "Fagan, Social Organization"];John M. Hagedorn, Homeboys, Dope Fiends, Legits, and New Jacks, 32 CRIMINOLOGY
197 (1995); Tom Mieczkowski, Geeking Up and ThrowingDown: Heroin Street Life in De-
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Martin Sanchez Jankowski, the author of what appears to be the
most comprehensive ethnographic survey of gangs to date, an
examination of thirty-seven gangs in three different cities over
ten years, found that "[t]he biggest money-maker and the one
product nearly every gang tries to market is illegal drugs." ' G
But likely the most insidious aspect of gang crime is one
that the academic literature often overlooks: gang activity is frequently undertaken out in the open, on the public ways, and in
full view of the rest of the community. 7 Openly conducted
criminal activity signals to the community that the police must
be either corrupt or inept-a complaint I have heard countless
times at community meetings-and a view that is especially destructive of community morale. Openly conducted criminality
speaks volumes as well about the degree to which gangs have
succeeded in intimidating the surrounding community. Few
other types of criminals commit their crimes in broad daylight,
and in full view of law-abiding persons. The fact that gangs are
willing to engage in drug sales and other types of criminal activity in the open sheds great light on their confidence that they
have thoroughly silenced law-abiding persons in their midst.
And when witnesses are too scared to testify and officers seem
helpless to stop drug trafficking, the police and community
alike become hopeless about their ability to restore community
stability.
Reliable statistics on the racial and ethnic dimension of
gang crime are also hard to come by, but the statistics that are
available consistently indicate that African-Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately represented among gangs." The
troit, 24 CmmnNoLoGY 645 (1986). To be sure, there are skeptics about the relationship between drug sales and gangs who observe that many gangs exhibit levels of disorganization inconsistent with efficient distribution of narcotics, but even the skeptics
acknowledge that larger and more sophisticated inner-city gangs are more likely to be
organized around drug sales. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 36, at 126-35.
" JANKOWSKI, supranote 45, at 120 (footnote omitted).
' Walter Miller is one of the few academics to note the significance of this aspect
of gang crime. See Miller, supranote 37, at 266. The leading example of openly conducted gang activity involves the control of turf in order to facilitate the sale of narcotics, a phenomenon considered at some length in Part Ifl, infra.
' See Kahan, supranote 20, at 391.
The prevalence of gang intimidation also is part of what makes gangs particularly successful at narcotics distribution, a point I will explore in Part III, infra.
This fact also explains why it is so difficult to mount a discrimination case
against a law that makes gang membership a basis for prosecution-the fact that those
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1998 National Youth Gang Survey estimated that nationwide, gang
membership was 46 percent Hispanic and 34 percent AfricanAmerican.5 Another survey of law enforcement agencies in seventy-nine large cities estimated that 48 percent of gang members were African-American and 30 percent were Hispanic. 2 Yet
a third survey of the police departments of the nine cities with
the largest gang populations estimated gang membership at
42.9 percent African-American and 44.4 percent Hispanic. 53 Research based on self-identification consistently shows that whites
do not join gangs at the same rate as African-Americans and
Hispanics.5 ' And a 1995 survey of students ages 12-19 found that
61 percent of Hispanic students and 44 percent of AfricanAmerican students reported gangs present at their schools,
compared to 33 percent of white students.55
A similar pattern is reflected in the statistics concerning
those charged with gang-related crime. For example, a study of
gang-related homicides in Chicago from 1990 to 1994 showed
that African-American males were about sixteen times more
likely to be charged with gang-related homicide than nonminority males, and Hispanic males were about thirteen times more
likely to be charged with gang-related homicide than nonminority males.5 The available statistics also show that minorities are
the victims of gang-related crimes more frequently than nonminoritiesY For example, a study of gang-related homicide in
prosecuted are disproportionately minority will not support a claim of selective
prosecution absent a showing, at a minimum, that minorities have been selected for
prosecution out of proportion to their representation among the universe of gang
members. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 104 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Trent,
718 F. Supp. 39, 41 (D. Or. 1989). See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 463-71 (1996).
5' 1998 NATIONAL YOUTH GANG SURVEY, supra note 25, at 20. These percentages
were even higher in large cities. See id. at 21.
" G. DAVID CURRY, RICHARD A. BALL & ROBERTJ. Fox, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, GANG
CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDKEEPING 9 (Aug. 1994).
" SeeWALTER B. MILLER, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME BYYOUTH GANGS AND GROUPS
IN THE UNITED STATES

76-79 (1992).

See CURRY & DECKER, supra note 25, at 73-74; KLEIN, supra note 36, at 105-10;
Finn-Aage Esbenson & L. Thomas Winfree, Race and Gender Differences Between Gang

and Nongang Youth: Resultsfrom a Multisite Survey, 15JUSTIcE Q. 505 (1998).
HOWELL & LYNCH, supra note 31, at 3.
" See ILL CRIM.JusTICE INF. AUTH., supra note 24, at 7.
"' See SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 37-40. In general, the National Crime Victimization
Survey has found that African-Americans are significantly more likely to be victims of
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Chicago from 1990 to 1994 showed African-American males
were about fifteen times more likely to be the victim of a gangrelated homicide than nonminority males, and Hispanic males
were about fourteen times more likely to be the victim of a
gang-related homicide than nonminority males!rs
The enormous problems that gang crime pose for inner-city
neighborhoods helps to explain a phenomenon little remarked
upon in legal scholarship, but which is commonplace for those
actually involved in urban law enforcement: among the residents of inner-city minority communities, there is an intense
demand for greater police presence and protection, not less 9
This reality is reflected in the available polling data, which consistently indicates that minorities are more likely to believe that
additional resources should be devoted to fighting crime than
are nonminorities.60 This phenomenon reflects a basic tenet of
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CMMNAL VICTIUZATON 1999: CHANGES 1998-99
both violent and property crime than are nonminorities.

Wi-- TRENDS 1993-99 6, 9 (Aug. 2000). Hispanics are significantly more likely to be
the victims of property crimes crimes than are nonminorities but only slightly more
likely to be victims of violent crime. Id. at 6, 9. This pattern has persisted since 1993.
Id. at 13, fig. 3, 4, 7, 8.
See ILL- GRIM. JUSTICE INF. AUTH., supranote 24, at 5.
To be fair, Professors Kahan and Meares have made this point, but they appear
to be about the only legal scholars aware of it. See Kahan & Meares. The Coming Cnis,
supra note 20, at 1162-63; Meares & Kahan, Wages, supra note 20, at 208. Ethnographers, however, are well aware of this phenomenon. For example, it appears repeatedly in Sudhir Venkatesh's recent study of a Chicago housing project. See, e.g.,
SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH,

AMERICAN PROJECT. THE RISE AND FALL OF A MODERN

GHETTO 68-77 (2000).
C
For example, in a 1999 survey, the National Opinion Research Center
("NORC") found that 70 percent of African-Americans but only 59 percent of whites
thought that too little is spent to fight crime. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS: 1999 126-27 tbl. 2.54
(Nov. 2000) [hereinafter cited as "1999 SOURCEBOOK71. This pattern has persisted in
each of the annual surveys since 1983. See id. Similarly, the Department of justice's
polling data indicates that the percentage of African-American households citing
crime as a problem in their neighborhoods is about two and one-half times higher
than for nonminority households, and even in central cities the percentage of African-American households citing crime as a neighborhood problem is about 50 percent higher than for nonminority households. See BUREAU OFJUSTIcE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PERCEPTIONS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME, 1995 1-2 (April 1998). Thus
it comes as no surprise, at least to me, that in Chicago, attendance at beat meetings in
Chicago's community-policing program is "highest in the city's African-nAmerican
beats and lowest-once population is taken into account-in predominantly white areas." CHICAGO COMMUNITY POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, ILL CRIM. JUSTICE INF.
AUTH., COMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, YEARS FIvE AND SIX: AN INTERIM REPORT 19
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urban sociology-communities view crime as a basic threat to
their existence, and will organize in order to bring both public
and private resources to bear against criminal activity to the extent that they are able.6 '
Nevertheless, I would not expect the statistics that I cite
above-much less my own views-to be persuasive to those who
have doubts about the fairness of gang suppression efforts in the
minority community. Statistics about the racial dimensions of
gang crime can readily be discounted as attributable to the biases of those who compile them. What is not so easy to discount, however, is the relationship between gang crime and the
plight of what has come to be called the inner-city "underclass."
As John Hagedorn, one of our leading gang ethnographers, has
observed:
To deny that gangs today are predominantly a minority problem inevitably leads to a failure to analyze the impact of our changing economy on
various classes within minority communities. The significance of the
emerformation of a minority urban underclass and the simultaneous
6
2
gence and entrenchment of gangs is completely overlooked.

In an effort to avoid the mistake that Hagedorn charges has
been made by so many who write about gang crime, I next advance a view of gang crime that takes account of the formation,
existence, and entrenchment of an urban and disproportionately minority underclass.

(May 1999). To similar effect, a reporter following narcotics enforcement in Harlem

for the New York Times recently observed:
It's supposedly common knowledge: black New Yorkers distrust the police. But on

the streets where Sergeant Brogli works, the biggest supporters of the police are AfricanAmerican. In the last 15 years, this neighborhood may have changed from primarily African-American to Dominican, but the citizens council that meets monthly at the local precinct, the 30th, is headed by an African-American, Hazel O'Reilly, and dominated by
African-Americans. At council meetings it is mainly black residents who attend to ask for
more police enforcement, more drug arrests, who want more people jailed for loitering and
trespassing.

Michael Winerip, Why Harlem Drug Cops Don't Discuss Race, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000, at
Al, 11 (emphasis in original). See also Blaine Harden, On Edge but Optimistic,New York
Blacks Offer Complex Views in Poll, N.Y. TIMEs,June 28, 2000, at Bl.
W See, e.g., ROBERTJ. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND

CRIME: THE DIMENSIONS OF EFFECrIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL 15-18, 34-57 (1993).
62 HAGEDORN, supra note 45, at 25-26 (footnote omitted).
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II. TOWARD A THEORY OF GANG CRIME
The seminal work on gangs is Frederic Thrasher's study of
1920s-era Chicago gangs. 6' Thrasher's view, based on intensive
field study, was that delinquent gangs were most likely to arise in
relatively poor, unstable neighborhoods, which generally lack
settled customs and institutions that inhibit delinquent conduct.64 By the 1960s, a virtual consensus emerged around
Thrasher's essential point-that gang formation is a consequence of the conflicts that emerge in socially disorganized
lower-class milieus. The leading scholars in the field differed in
their accounts of the nature of these conflicts, but essentially
agreed that the social stresses commonly experienced in lowerclass slum neighborhoods are at the heart of gang formation.6
FREDERIcKM. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS INCHicAGO (1927).
See generally, e.g., BuRSiK& GRAsMICx, supra note 61, at 119-21; DanielJ. Monti. Ongins
and Problemsof GangResearch in the United States, in GANGS, supra note 45, at 4-17.
6
See THRASHER, supra note 63. Thrasher's account of the origin and function of
gangs is enormously rich and suggestive, and deserves to be quoted at some length:
Gangs represent the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for themselves
where none adequate to their needs exists. What boys get out of such association that they
do not get otherwise under the conditions that adult society imposes is the thrill and zest of
participation in common interests, more especially in corporate action, in hunting, capture, conflict, flight, and escape. Conflict with other gangs and the world about them furnishes the occasion for many of their exciting group activities.
The failure of the normally directing and controlling customs and instituuons to
function efficiently in the boy's experience is indicated by the disintegration of family life.
inefficiency of schools, formalism and externality of religion, corruption and indifference
in local politics, low wages and monotony in occupational activities, and lack of opportunity for wholesome recreation. All these factors enter into the picture of the moral and
economic frontier, and, coupled with deterioration in housing, sanitation, and other conditions of life in the slum, give the impression of general disorder and decay.
The gang functions with reference to these conditions in two ways: It offers a substitute for what society fails to give; and it provides relief from suppression and distasteful behavior. It fills a gap and affords an escape. Here again we may conceive of it as an
interstitial group providing interstitial activities for its members. Thus the gang, itself a
natural and spontaneous type of organization arising through conflict, is a symptom of disorganization in the larger social framework.
Id. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted) See, e.g., ALBERT K. COHEN, DELINQUENT BOYS: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG (1955);
RicssRD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNr . A THEORY
OF DELiNQUENT GANGS (1960); Walter B. Miller, Lower Class Culture as a GeneratingMilieu of GangDelinquency, 14J. Soc. ISSUEs 5 (1958); Hyman Rodman, The Lower Class
Value Stretch, 42 Soc. FORCES 205 (1963). This work, in turn, built upon the work of
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, who had demonstrated that delinquency rates were
related to the economic and social characteristics of inner-city communities. See
BURSMK & GRASMICK, supra note 61, at 25-38. See also CLIFORD R. SHAW & HENR D.
McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN URBAN AREAS (1942).
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Worthy of special attention-both because it accurately predicted much of what was to follow and because of the special
pertinence that it has for racial minorities-is the "blocked opportunity" thesis advanced by Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E.
Ohlin.
Cloward and Ohlin advanced a "strain" theory, explaining
the emergence of delinquent conduct among groups of youth
in terms of the quest for upward mobility. Western industrialized societies, they observed, claim adherence to meritocratic
principles, but when individuals come to believe that their aspirations cannot be realized by legitimate means, they experience
pressure toward deviant behavior.r Cloward and Ohlin argued
that when discrete groups come to believe that they cannot attain their economic and social objectives by legitimate means,
they turn to illegitimate ones: "It is our view that pressures toward the formation of delinquent subcultures originate in
marked discrepancies between culturally induced aspirations
among lower-class youth and the possibility of achieving them
by legitimate means."67 This pressure is most common within
relatively disadvantaged classes, because although lower-class
individuals "ma yearn to rise in the social structure, the obstacles are great." And "[i]f traditional channels to higher position, such as education, are restricted for large categories of
people, then pressures will mount for the use of alternative
routes."6 The result is that "many lower class youths turn away
from legitimate channels, adopting other means beyond middle
class mores, which might offer a possible route to successgoals." 70 Cloward and Ohlin premised this view on both sociological theory and research indicating that delinquency is most

'

See CLOWARD & OHIN, supranote 65, at 80-82.

Id. at 78.
Id. at 85. In particular, Cloward and Ohlin argued, lower-class youths frequently
perceive that their educational opportunities are limited. See id. at 97-99.
, Id. at 104. Cloward and Ohlin noted that among lower-class youths, sports or
entertainment is frequently thought of as an alternative route to success by legitimate
means, but eventually they discover that relatively few persons can succeed through
these routes. See id. at 104-05.
" Id. at 105. As Cloward and Ohlin put it: "[D]emocratizing the criteria for
evaluation without at the same time increasing the opportunities available to lowerclass youngsters will accentuate the conditions that produce feelings of unjust deprivation." Id. at 120-21.
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frequent among those that believe that7 they have been unjustly
denied opportunities for advancement.
Where relatively large and coherent groups perceive that
they confront common unjust barriers to advancement, Cloward
and Ohlin reasoned, a deviant subculture is likely to form.
This occurs, they argued, when the prevailing social order is
seen as illegitimate, so that guilt about the violation of social
mores is unlikely to restrain deviant conduct.m One example of
this phenomenon that Cloward and Ohlin identified was when
discrete racial groups come to believe that despite the prevailing
meritocratic dogma, racial criteria in fact are used to determine
who can advance in society.74 The type of deviant subculture
that will develop in a given neighborhood, Cloward and Ohlin
thought, depends on the character of the neighborhood.'
When a lower-class neighborhood that experiences group pressure toward deviance also contains relatively stable criminal opportunities, what they called a "criminal subculture" will
develop, as youths are drawn toward a stable organized crime
structure. 76 But in relatively unstable neighborhoods, what develops is a "conflict subculture" that produces more violent behavior, as various groups compete for limited criminal
opportunities.
See id. at 113-21.
See id. at 125-30.
See id. at 130-39. Similarly, Cloward and Ohlin contended that the pressures toward delinquency were greatest when individuals attribute "the cause of failure to the
social order rather than to oneself, for the way in which one explains his failure
largely determines what he will do about it." Id. at 111.
' See id. at 119-21. They supported this argument in particular with reference to
the barriers confronting African-Americans. See id. at 121-24.
See id. at 166.
See id. at 161-71. Cloward and Ohlin argued that the stability of the criminal
structure in a neighborhood is essential to the formation of this subculture: "Only
those neighborhoods where crime flourishes as a stable, indigenous institution are
fertile criminal learning environments for the young." Id. at 148.
'
See id. at 171-72. The less stable the neighborhood, the more likely a conflict
subculture would develop: "Transiency and instability, in combination, produce powerful pressures for violent behavior among the young in these areas." Id. at 172. See
also id. at 175-78. As for the factors that promote instability, Cloward and Ohlin explained:
The many forces making for instability in the social organization of some slum areas mdude high rates of vertical and geographic mobility- massive housing projects in which
"site tenants" are not accorded priority in occupancy, so that traditional residents are dspersed and "strangers" reassembled; and changing land use, as in the case of residential
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Cloward and Ohlin concluded with a prediction:
"[D] elinquency will become increasingly aggressive and violent
in the future as a result of the disintegration of slum organization. 7 8 Among the factors that they believed would contribute
to increasing disorganization of lower-class communities were
the decline in power of traditional organized crime, the decline
of urban political machines and their ability to provide services
to those communities, and massive "slum clearance" projects."9
They concluded: "the major effort of those who wish to eliminate delinquency should be directed to the reorganization of
slum communities."80
Of course, in the four decades since Cloward and Ohlin advanced their theory, social organization in the inner city has
Instead, an increasingly service-oriented
hardly improved.
economy offered more restricted opportunities to individuals
with limited skills and educational attainments; and reduced
opportunities for upward mobility among the lower classes, in
turn, helped to create what has come to be called an "underclass, a concept reflecting the characteristics that Cloward and
Ohlin thought would produce violent gangs. 2
The leading academic expositor of underclass theory is William Julius Wilson. His view-focusing on the inner-city Africanareas that are encroached upon by the expansion of adjacent commercial or industrial areas. Forces of this kind keep a community off-balance, for tentative efforts to develop social organization are quickly checked.
Id. at 172. Cloward and Ohlin also described what they labeled as the "retreatist subculture," in which individuals perceive themselves to have limited opportunities for
advancement through both legitimate and illegitimate means, and therefore abandon
any hope of advancement, frequently turning to drug use. See id. at 179-84.
Id. at 203.
See id. at 204-11.
Id. at 211. The view that the degree of social organization in an underclass
neighborhood has an important relationship to crime (recently stressed by Professors
Kahan and Meares, see, e.g., Kahan, supra note 20, at 355-61; Meares, supra note 20, at
194-98), is consistent with the view that limited economic opportunities available to
the underclass provide a powerful stimulant to gang crime. Social organization theory does not purport to explain what causes people to turn to crime, but rather how
social controls can deter such persons from committing crimes, and it is the absence
of social organization in many underclass communities that prevents them from developing the public and private infrastructure necessary to provide legitimate opportunities to neighborhood youth. See BuRsIK & GRAMsicK, supra note 61, at 143-46;
CovEY,MENARD & FRANZESE, supra note 25, at 215-16.
" SeeWILSON, supra note 23, at 3-19.
See CLOWARD & OHUN, supra note 65, at 171-72.
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American community in particular-is that in disadvantaged inner-city minority communities, an underclass has been created
consisting of individuals who are "increasingly isolated socially
from mainstream patterns and norms of behavior. "" In Wilson's view, the urban underclass faces two primary impediments
to upward mobility."' First, in the past thirty years economic
opportunities available to persons with relatively limited educational attainment have sharply diminished as a result of structural changes in the economy that have reduced the demand
for low-skill workers in the manufacturing and industrial sectors.s Second, there has been an enormous increase in femaleheaded families and out-of-wedlock births in the AfricanAmerican community, 6 and that as well vastly diminishes the
economic prospects for the members of these families.8 The
impediments that the underclass faces to upward mobility interact with the profound effects that Wilson believes the departure
of the middle-class from inner-city slum neighborhoods has had
on those too poor to leave."e He explains that
the exodus of middle- and working-class families from many ghetto
neighborhoods removes an important "social buffer" that could deflect
the full impact of the kind of prolonged and increasing joblessness that
plagued inner-city neighborhoods in the 1970s and early 1980s, joblessness created by uneven economic growth and periodic recessions. This
argument is based on the assumption that even if the truly disadvantaged
segments of an inner-city area experience a significant increase in longterm spells of joblessness, the basic institutions in that area (churches,
schools, stores, recreational facilities, etc.) would remain viable if much
WILSON, supra note 23, at 8.
See, e.g., id. at 26-46.
See id. at 39-46, 57-58, 100-04; WIuiAM JulIus WILSON, THE DECUNING
SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERIC.AN INSTrrUTIONS 92-99, 113-15,
169 (2d ed. 1980).
"' See WILLIAM JULITS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR 87-94 (1996); WILSON, supranote 23, at 26-29, 66-71; WILSON, supra note

85, at 132, 158.
" See WILSON, supra note 86, at 91-94; WILSON, supra note 23, at 26-29, 71-72:
WILSON, supra note 85, at 130-34. Moreover, inculcating values that stress the importance of work is all the more difficult because so many families in underclass neighborhoods have only one parent present, making supervision of children more
difficult. See WILSON, supra note 86, at 93-94; WILSON, supra note 23, at 74-76. Even
when two parents are present, supervision of children is much more difficult in disordered underclass neighborhoods. See WILSON, supra note 86, at 62-64.
"See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 86, at 13-17, 65-72; WILSON, supra note 85, at 151-54,
156-58.
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of the base of their support comes from the more economically stable
and secure families. Moreover, the very presence of these families during such periods provides mainstream role models that help keep alive
the perception that education is meaningful, that steady employment is
a viable alternative to welfare, and that family stability is the norm, not
the exception.

Accordingly, Wilson believes that "the groups that have been
left behind are collectively different from those that lived in
these neighborhoods in earlier years."9
The isolation of underclass neighborhoods from middleclass values makes upward mobility all the more difficult, Wilson
argues.9 ' The underclass becomes discouraged about opportunities for employment, believing that inner-city residents do not
receive fair opportunities for advancement. 92 And employers, in
turn, fear hiring residents of inner-city neighborhoods, believing that they are not reliable employees. 93 As a result, joblessness has persisted in underclass neighborhoods despite the
prolonged economic expansion of the 1990s.'
The ultimate consequence of social isolation, Wilson argues,
is that welfare and the underground economy become an important means of support in these neighborhoods.95 Crime, in
particular, flourishes in these underclass neighborhoods where
economic opportunities are limited: "The underclass ... knows
that illegal activities, in many respects, provide a more lucrative
alternative to low-wage employment." 96 And indeed, crime is
endemic in these neighborhoods.97

WILSON, supra note 23, at 56. Moreover, the pervasive instability in underclass
neighborhoods reinforces social isolation: "[T]he communities of the underclass are
plagued by massive joblessness, flagrant and open lawlessness, and low-achieving
schools, and therefore tend to be avoided by outsiders." Id. at 58.
Id. at 8.

See id. at 56.
See WILSON, supra note 86, at 72-86. Residents therefore do not pursue educa-

tional or employment opportunities because they become hopeless. See id. at 137-45;
85, at 107-10.
" SeeWILSON, sup-a note 86, at 111-45.
See id. at 25-34, 145-46.
See WILSON, supra note 23, at 57-62.
See WILSON, supra note 85, at 108.

WILSON, supra note

'

' See WILSON, supra note 23, at 21-23; WILSON, supra note 86, at 22-25. See also LaurenJ. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely DisadvantagedNeighborhoods and Urban Crime,
75 Soc. FORcES 619 (1996).
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The obstacles confronting the underclass are disproportionately experienced by African-Americans, since no other racial or ethnic group is so concentrated within impoverished and
disorganized communities. 9s Many Hispanic neighborhoods
have also experienced conditions that characterize the AfricanAmerican underclass." As a statistical matter, it is undeniable
that African-Americans and Hispanics are grossly overrepresented among those who live in poverty. 00 And that overrepresentation is explained, at least in significant part, by the role
that racism plays in creating a socially-isolated underclass. Wilson's account, for example, stresses the role of employment discrimination against minorities in entrenching the underclass.'"'
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton have added that the disproportionate representation of African-Americans in underclass
neighborhoods is also a consequence of housing discrimination
against African-Americans, who face potent discriminatory barexperiencing the
riers when attempting to leave neighborhoods
0 2
describes.
Wilson
that
social isolation
The view that there is an identifiable group facing powerful
barriers to upward mobility that can be fairly characterized as an
"underclass" is now widely accepted. 03 As a statistical matter,
' See Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a 7hearw of Race, Crame,
and UrbanInequality, in CRIE AND INEQuALriy 40-44 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson
eds., 1995) [hereinafter cited as "CRIME AND INEQUALm].
' See genera/!yJoan Moore, Is There a Hispanic Underdass?, 70 Soc. SCIENCE Q. 265
(1989); Anne M. Santiago & Margaret G. Wilder, ResidentialSegregatwn and the Links to
Minority Poverty: The Case of Latinos in the United States, 38 SOC. PROBS. 492 (1991); Joan
Moore & Raquel Pinderhughes, Introduction, in IN THE BARRIos: LATINOs AND THE
UNDERCLASS DEBATE x-xxxix (Joan Moore & Raquel Pinderhughes eds., 1993).
'" The most recent statistics available from the Bureau of the Census indicate that
while 11.8 percent of the population lives in poverty, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999 vii (Sep. 2000). the figure is
22.8 percent for Hispanics and 23.6 percent for African-Americans, see ul. at vii-x.
The poverty rate for white non-Hispanics was 7.7 percent, about one-third of the poverty rate for African-Americans and Hispanics. See id. at x.
"' SeeWISON, supranote 86, at 111-45.
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGAION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 7-9, 118-47 (1993). Wilson has also acknowledged the role that this form of racial segregation has played in creating a disproportionately minority underclass. See Sampson & Wilson, supranote 98, at 43-44.
'See, e.g., KEN AULETrA, THE UNDERCLASS 20-50 (1982); DOUGLAS G. GLAScOW,
Tim BLACK UNDERCLASS: POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMIENT AND ENTRAPMENT OF GHErrO YOrnrH
3-15 (1981); Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox, M THE

URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 23, at 15-25.
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there can be little doubt that 1970 began an era in which upward mobility at the bottom rung of the economic ladder came
to a halt-despite the booming economy of recent years, the
proportion of Americans living in poverty in 1999 was higher
than in

19 69

.1°4 And of even greater pertinence to criminal jus-

tice policy, there is a growing body of evidence that as the economic opportunities available to low-skill residents of underclass
communities have constricted, criminal activity has become a rational economic decision in those communities. 05
The minority underclass thus has become a paradigmatic
example of a discrete group confronting what Cloward and
Ohlin called "blocked opportunities. "' While living in a nation
that proclaims fealty to a meritocratic ideal, the minority underclass confronts an economy offering limited opportunities to
unskilled workers, its children are confined to inferior schools,
and it confronts both real and perceived racism as a powerful
and wholly illegitimate barrier to upward mobility.T07 The
'o See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 100, at B-7 tbl. B-2. Income inequality
also has risen over the last thirty years. The lowest quintile's share of household income declined from 4.0 percent in 1970 to 3.6 percent in 1999. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999 xii tbl.
C (Sep. 2000).
'" For a useful review of the evidence that engaging in illegal activity constitutes a
rational economic decision for many members of the minority underclass, see Jeffrey
Fagan & Richard Freeman, Crime and Work, in CRIME &JuSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
245-57 (Michael Tonry ed., 1999). One of the few studies to examine the economics
of gang-related drug trafficking confirms this view. Professors Levitt and Venkatesh
obtained the records of a large African-American gang involved in drug trafficking,
and found that the wage structure of the gang was highly skewed, with foot soldiers'
earnings at or below minimum wage but superiors earning much higher relative
wages than typically found in the private sector. See Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi
Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang'sFinances, 115 Q.J. ECON. 755,
769-75 (2000). They add: "Given the enormous gap between the wages of the foot
soldiers and those higher up in the gang, the most reasonable way to view the economic aspects of the decision to join the gang is as a tournament, i.e., a situation in
which the participants vie for large awards that only a small fraction will eventually
obtain." Id. at 773 (citation omitted).

See CLOWARD & OHLIN, supra note 65, at 105.
For a particularly useful discussion of the impact that labor market barriers confronting underclass youth have on the culture in underclass neighborhoods, see
MERCER L. SULLIVAN, "GETTING PAID": YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY 22531 (1989). Indeed, there is reason to question whether the current labor market provides inner-city minorities with opportunities even as great as existed-at least in some
parts of the country-prior to the emergence of the civil rights laws. Even before the
demise of formal racial segregation, minorities at least on occasion were able to take
advantage of the opportunities once available to low-skill workers. The waves of Afri-
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blocked opportunity thesis thus suggests that minority underclass neighborhoods should be fertile breeding grounds for
gang crime.108
And in fact, the work that has been done in gang ethnography confirms that underclass conditions powerfully stimulate
gang formation. Indeed, there is a virtual consensus among
gang researchers on this point.'m In his ethnographic study of
gang activity in a largely African-American Chicago housing project, for example, Sudhir Venkatesh observed a direct relationship between the decline in labor-market opportunities for
inner-city youth in the Chicago area and the view that project
residents took of gangs, finding that as economic opportunities
constricted during the 1970s and 1980s "youth gangs' stature in
the community shifted from 'delinquent' to economic ....

Irving Spergel has observed, summarizing gang research in the
1980s and early 1990s, "in inner-city African-American communities, limited criminal opportunity systems have evolved as
gangs change from status-oriented conflict groups to more rational but predatory organizations, with special interests in drug

can-American migration to northern cities during the twentieth century, for example,
were largely motivated by the economic opportunities available there. See generally
mGRATnm .rD How IT
NIcHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK
CHANGED A.MERICA (1991). Much Hispanic migration had a similar motivation. See
Moore & Pinderhughes, supra note 99, at xvi-xx.
" In fact, Professor Massey has made a compelling statistical case that the disproportionate involvement of the minorities in the criminal justice s)stem is a direct
function of the extent to which minorities live in socially isolated underclass neighborhoods. See Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away With Murder Segregation and 11olent
Crimein Urban America, 143 U. PA. L REv. 1203 (1995).
1 See, e.g., BuRsm & GRASMICR, supra note 61, at 143-46; CURRy & DECER, supra
note 25, at 74, 124; HAGEDORN, supra note 45, at 111-28; JANKOWS-K, sura note 45. at
23-31 (1991); KLEIN, supra note 36, at 193-97; MOORE, supra note 40, at 5-7, 133-36;
MOORE, supra note 45, at 27-54; PADILLA, supra note 45, at 32-54; &NDERS, supra note
40, at 41-46; TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 103-15; JAmEs DIEGO VIGIL, Bmwtso G.ANcs:
AND IDENT IYIN SouT-ERN CALIFORNIA 24-34 (1988); Fagan, supra note 37.
STREET L
at 55-57; Miller, supranote 37, at 278-83; DanielJ. Monti, PublicPolicy and Gangs: Soczal
Scence and the Urban Underclass, in GANGS, supra note 45, at 310-14.
"'Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Gang in the Cominund, in GANGS IN ERICA 1996
ED., supra note 24, at 247. See also VENKATESH, supra note 59, at 13.4-39, 161-62. For an
historical account of how constricted opportunities have stimulated gang activity in
Chicago's African-American community in recent decades, see UsExt EUGE-NEE PERKINS,
EXPLOSION OF CHICAGO'S BLAcK STREET GANGS: 1900 TO PRESENT 20-53 (1987).
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trafficking and other criminal gain."''. Pamela Jackson has even
demonstrated a statistical relationship between the indicia of an
underclass neighborhood and the indicia of gang activity." 2 In
disorganized and disadvantaged underclass communities, ethnographers observe, gangs thrive because they provide prestige,
social structure, and support systems for youths who may have
little other structure in their lives." 3 Gang membership may also
.. SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 62. Spergel describes the same phenomenon in underclass Hispanic neighborhoods. See id. at 63-64. Here is Wilson's complementary
description of the role of drug trafficking in underclass neighborhoods:
Consider, for example, the problems of drug trafficking and violent crime. As many
studies have revealed, the decline in legitimate employment opportunities among innercity residents has increased incentives to sell drugs. The distribution of crack in a neighborhood attracts individuals involved in violence and lawlessness .... The association is
especially strong in inner-city ghetto neighborhoods plagued byjoblessness and weak social
organization.
Violent persons in the crack-cocaine marketplace have a powerful impact on the social organization of a neighborhood. Neighborhoods plagued by high joblessness, insufficient economic opportunities, and high residential mobility are unable to control the
volatile drug market and the violent crimes related to it. As informal controls weaken, the
social processes that regulate behavior change.

Moreover, as Alfred Blumstein pointed out, the drug industry actively recruits teenagers in the neighborhood "partly because they will work more cheaply than adults, partly
because they may be less vulnerable to the punishments imposed by the adult criminal justice system, partly because they tend to be daring and willing to take risks that more mature adults would eschew." Inner-city black youths with limited prospects for stable or
attractive employment are easily lured into drug trafficking and therefore increasingly find
themselves involved in the violent behavior that accompanies it.
WILSON, "upranote 85, at 21-22. See also Alfred Blumstein, Violence by Young People:
Why the Deadly Nexus ?,JuvWNILEJusrncEJ., Aug. 1995, at 2. I will consider the relationship between drug trafficking and violence at greater length in Part III, infra.
"' See Pamela Irving Jackson, Crime, Youth Gangs, and Urban Transition: The Social
Dislocationsof PostindustrialEconomic Development, 8JUSTIcE Q. 379 (1991).
' See, e.g., CURRY & DECKER, supra note 25, at 63, 124-25; KLEIN, supra note 36, at
74-80; DEBORAH PROTHROW-STITH, DEADLY CONSEQUENCES 106-10 (1991); SPERGEL, su-

pra note 30, at 71-73; VALDEZ, supranote 44, at 15-16 (1997); VIGIL, supra note 109, at
90-92, 150-69. For example, gangs frequently prescribe an elaborate code of behavior
for members that creates considerable cohesion. See, e.g., CURRY& DECKER, supra note
25, at 76-78;JANKOwSKi, supra note 45, at 78-84. Accordingly, gangs provide the guidance and structure that children in underclass communities frequently do not receive
from parents. See, e.g., KAREN L. KINNEAR, GANGS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 6 (1996);

SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 94-96. Irving Spergel has elaborated:
A process of destructive socialization occurs: youths who have insufficient social support at home from separated, alienated, or unemployed parents receive inadequate and
uncaring attention at school, where they consequently fall or are inadequately educated.
Furthermore, youth or community agencies no longer have the resources or capabilities to
reach out to these now more socially detached and disorganized young people. Youths
must learn to survive on the streets, through attachment to a variety of semi-organized illegitimate structures and criminal and status-providing activities.
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be an important means of self-protection from the many threats
confronting residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods."' But
even more important is the opportunity for financial gain that
gang membership provides to those who perceive their legitimate opportunities for upward mobility to be limited at best.
Gang ethnography again bears out this point. Jankowski's study,
for example, found that the opportunity for material gain was
the chief reason cited by gang members for joining a street
gang."5 Sudhir Venkatesh, whose ethnographic studies are
nearly as comprehensive asJankowski's, also found the prospect
of material gain to be a principal motive for gang participaconclusion is consistent with the findings of
tion." 6 And 11this
7
many others.
Id. at 62-63.
"' See, e.g., CURRY & DECKER, supra note 25, at 63; JANKowrsiu, supra note 45, at 4445; PADaLLA, supra note 45, at 65-68; SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 92-93.
"
"

SeeJANKOWSKi, supranote 45, at 40-42.
Venkatesh concluded:

Gang members do find in corporate gang activity a measure of peer group support
and a sense of belonging to a larger community;, however, these symbolic benefits alone
also seems to be incapable of sustaining motivation in gang-based entrepeneurialism over
an extended time period, perhaps because gang members eventually find social support
from peers who are not affiliated with gangs.
Indeed, the life-course appears to be the best perspective from vhich to understand
the interaction of symbolic and economic incentives. Ethnographic observauons of several
gangs over an extended period of time indicate an aging-out pattern. For example. at the
most basic level, the successful corporate gang will provide for all of its members an immediate wage and a direct sense of community and identity. The significance of these two
benefits changes, however, as the individual member ages. In his role as an entering foot
solider, the member has few financial commitments, and so gang involvement makes possible fairly continuous consumption and provides an alternative to menial work in the service sector, along with the fellowship of one's peers. The younger foot soldier is motivated
to stay in the gang by the prospect of a potentially lucrative salary as an officer. Ho.,ever,
for the older, more experienced drug trader, one with perhaps a growing number of financial and familial commitments, the immediate economic vage is no longer sufficient:
similarly, while the benefits of the peer group continue to exist, opportunities for high income and promotion in the gang diminish. It is at this point that most of the gang members in this sample abdicated their involvement in the gang's entrepeneunal activities and
chose instead to direct their energies to the mainstream labor market. While many continued to participate in the gang's social activities, the symbolic attracuon of dramatic future material rewards appeared to lose its motivating capacity.
Sudhir Venkatesh, The FinancialActivity of a Modern American Street Gang, m I LOOKING
AT CRIME FROM THE STREET LEVEL PLENARY PAPERS OF THE 1999 CO\,FE.NCE ON
CRImINAL JusTIcE RESEARCH AND EVALUATioN-ENHANCaNG PoucY AND PRACCE
THROUGH RESEARCH 6-7 (U.S. Dep't ofJustice Nov. 1999).
"' See, e.g., CURRY& DECKER, supra note 25, at 62-63, 137-40; MOORE, supra note 40,
at 42-44; PADt.LA, supra note 45, at 101-03; SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 94; SULLVAN,, su-

pra note 107, at 117, 222-50; TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 5-6, 10-12, 61, 99-102; Fagan,
supra note 37, at 52-54;Jeffrey Fagan, The PoliticalEconomy ofDrugDealingAnzong Urban
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Because of the persistence and magnitude of poverty in minority underclass neighborhoods, the underground drug economy is one of the primary sources of economic opportunity
available in those neighborhoods."" Crime rates continue to reflect the sustained attraction of narcotics trafficking; there is little evidence that drug crime has declined with the general trend
toward declining crime rates. To the contrary, drug arrests continue to rise," 9 and despite the enormous resources devoted to
drug-law enforcement, the supply and price of illegal drugs has
remained stable.' 20 Phillippe Bourgeois has argued that disadvantaged minorities are particularly vulnerable to the attractions
of the drug economy, since underclass minorities are particularly skeptical about the legitimate economy by virtue of their
experiences with racism. 121 For racial minorities who confront
Gangs, in DRUGS AND THE COMMUNITY: INVOLVING COMMUNITY RESIDENTS IN
COMBATTING THE ILLEGAL SALE OF DRUGS 27-45 (Robert C. Davis, Arthur J. Lurigio &
Dennis P. Rosenbaum eds., 1993) (hereinafter cited as "DRUGS AND THE COMMUNITY"].
"' See, e.g., ELIjAH ANDERSON, STREETvISE: RACE, CLASS AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY 3-5, 57-84, 239-47 (1990); PHILLIPPE BOURGEOIS, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT:
SELLING CRACKIN EL BARRIO 2-9, 319-21 (1996); PADILLA, supra note 45, at 48-54, 10103; SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 239-41; Bruce D.Johnson et al., DrugAbuse in the Inner
City: Impact on Hard-Drug Users and the Community, in DRUGS AND CRIME 23-26, 33-35
(Michael Tonry & James Q. Wilson eds., 1990) [hereinafter cited as "DRUGS AND
CRIME"]; Fagan, supra note 37, at 58-63; Eloise Dunlap & Bruce D.Johnson, The Setting
for the Crack Era: Macro Forces, Micro Consequences (1960-92), 24 J. PSYCHlOACTIvE DRUGS
307 (1992); Taylor, supranote 45, at 115; Venkatesh, supranote 110, at 245-47.
"' According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arrests for drug-law violations
rose 7.3 percent from 1995 to 1999, and 36.5 percent from 1990 to 1999. SeeFEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 211, 216 tbl. 32, 218 tbl. 34. (2000). Among persons under

18 years old, drug arrests rose 132.2 percent from 1990 to 1999. See id. at 216 tbl.
3.89.
" Even the Office of National Drug Control Policy acknowledges that prices for
cocaine, heroin and marijuana have remained stable in recent years, and remain
readily available to purchasers. See OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 12-18 (2000). The report

also acknowledges that the availability of methamphetamine is increasing rapidly. See
id. at 19-20. Moreover, while polling data suggests a decline in drug use in recent
years, see 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 60, at 248 tbl. 3.89, those statistics may reflect
no more than increasing unwillingness of those polled to admit to drug involvement.
The less manipulable statistics reflecting drug-related medical emergencies have not
shown a similar decline. See id. at 257 tbl. 3.107. See generally Thomas M. Mieczkowski,
The Prevalence of Drug Use in the United States, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REvIEW OF
RESEARCH 349-414 (Michael Tonry ed., 1996).
...See Phillippe Bourgeois, In Search of Horatio Alger: Culture and Ideology in the Crack
Economy, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 619 (1989).
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racial as well as economic barriers, the economic opportunities
that gangs offer are therefore especially potent.'2 That view is
supported by statistics on the racial composition of gangs suggesting that poverty alone does not explain gang membership;
the proportion of minorities among gang members substantially
exceeds the proportion of minorities living in poverty.23 In
short, with an entrenched and disproportionately minority underclass
comes entrenched and disproportionately minority
124
gangs.
This brief survey of contemporary ethnographic research
on gang activity brings me back to Cloward and Olin's view of
gang formation. A theory resting on "blocked opportunities"
explains the propensity for gang activity in underclass neighborhoods, as well as the increasing emphasis gangs have placed
on sales of narcotics.'2 It is also certainly consistent with the
" Indeed, the 1996 National Youth Gang Survey found that minority gang members, especially African-Americans, were more likely to be involved in drug sales than
nonminority gang members. See OFFICE OF JuVENILE JUsTIcE & DELIQUENC"
PREVI-ON, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 1996 NATIONAL YouTH GANG SuRTr SU.wLARY 4 1.
43-44 (Oct. 1999).
" Although the most recent census data shows that 22.8 percent of Hispanics and
23.6 percent of Afican-Americans live in poverty, see BUF,%u OF THE CENSUS, suPra
note 100, at vi, the statistics on the racial composition of gang membership that I discuss above indicate the minorities represent an even higher proportion of gang
membership. See text at notes 51-57.
...
AsJeffrey Fagan has observed:
The structural changes in U.S. society that gave rise to these new forms of gangs and
ganging will not easily be undone. If gangs have evolved in a %.a)that responds to the new
social, economic and cultural realities of the late 20th century. then gangs may become a
durable and long-lasting feature of adolescent and neighborhood life - that is, gangs may
become institutionalized in U.S. suburbs and cities as part of the social and cultural ecology of neighborhoods and as a career choice for young adolescents that may compete ith
diminishingjobs and other social roles.
Fagan, supra note 37, at 69.
" The difficulties of gathering reliable empirical evidence on the extent to which
a "strain" theory such as that advanced by Cloward and Ohlin explains gang membership should be readily apparent. One of the few studies that have attempted to examine the matter, however, produced at least some support for this view. Based on a
multivariate analysis of the results of two surveys-one a nationwide survey of young
persons in custody and the other a survey of Seattle youth disproportionately likely to
have a record of police contact or juvenile court disposition, the authors concluded
that lack of maternal supervision, a discrepancy between financial goals and educational expectations, and the expression of deviant attitudes toward the law, were each
significantly correlated to gang membership. See David Brownfield et al., Correlatesof
Gang Membership: A Test of Strain, Social Learning,and Social Control Theories. 4J. G.G
RES. 11 (1997).
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analysis of Wilson and others about the character of the innercity underclass. 2 6 But most important for present purposes is
the implication for crime control that this view of gang formation holds. When crime comes to be seen as a rational choice
for residents of a discrete neighborhood, that will ultimately
have a profound impact on social norms in that neighborhood,
and, therefore, the willingness and ability of its residents to
choose legitimate paths to upward mobility. Mercer Sullivan, in
his ethnographic study of three disadvantaged New York neighborhoods, made this point as he synthesized economic and cultural explanations for underclass crime, concluding that crime
comes to be tolerated in a community to the extent that it
comes to be seen as a necessary means of bringing resources
into that community. 2 7 Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins
have made a similar point, observing that openly conducted
drug dealing in impoverished communities with few other economic opportunities causes a potent form of community demoralization to "set in, making all forms of illegitimate activities
seem both more attractive and less credibly stigmatized.' ' 2 8 This
"' Probably the most serious objection that has been made to Cloward and Ohlin
in light of contemporary ethnographic research on gang crime is the failure of that
research to identify the distinct subcultures that Cloward and Ohlin described. See,
e.g., BURSIK & GRASMIcK, supra note 61, at 138-42; Fagan, supra note 37, at 43-44. Indeed, Joan Moore has questioned the concept of distinct gang subculture altogether,
at least for the Southern California Hispanic gangs that she has studied, observing
that Hispanic gangs frequently reflect many of the values of the community in which
they develop. See MOORE, supra note 45, at 49-54; Joan Moore, Gangs, Drugs, and Violenc in GANGS, supra note 45, at 33-34. I quite agree that the evidence does not support the existence of distinct subcultures as described by Cloward and Ohlin. For
example, the evidence does not support a distinction between "criminal" and "conflict" subcultures; the same gangs may engage in stable, ongoing criminal activity
punctuated by bouts of sustained violence, a point considered at some length in Part
III, infra. Moreover, gangs that otherwise might be considered either conflict or
criminally oriented also frequently reflect elements of what Cloward and Ohlin called
a retreatist subculture, given the abundant evidence that gang members use drugs at
high rates. See, e.g., COvEY, MENARD & FRANZESE, supra note 25, at 55-57; HOWELL &
DECKER, supra note 45, at 2. But the problems with Cloward and Ohlin's effort to
classify gangs do not impugn the importance that blocked opportunities has in gang
formation, a point that even Joan Moore fully embraces. See MOORE, supra note 40, at
42-44; MOORE, supra note 45, at 27-34, 51-54.
SeeSULLUVAN, supra note 107, at 244-50.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL 149 (1992). Vekatesh's study of a Chicago housing project powerfully

documents community demoralization caused by open gang activity, especially narcotics trafficking. SeeVENKATSH, supranote 59, at 110-12.
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assessment, of course, does not even take into account the
plethora of other consequences of gang criminality for a community, such as its effects on property values, incentives to invest, the willingness of community residents to assist law
enforcement efforts, and the incentive for those who can afford
to out-migrate to do so.'1
In short, gang crime is a real threat to the inner-city minority community, not just an excuse for aggressive policing.
Whether, as a sociological matter, one accepts a "strain" theory
like that advanced by Cloward and Ohlin, a theory stressing the
absence of social controls in the inner city, or one stressing the
patterns of social learning in certain communities as the basis
on which gangs form, ultimately it should be plain that when
community mores are undermined by gang criminality, the slim
chance that the inner city has for revitalization becomes even
slimmer.30 Of course, the factors that determine what course
any given individual's life will take are enormously complex,
and indeed most residents of underclass communities do not
turn to gang crime.' But if one takes seriously the magnitude
of the barriers that confront the minority underclass, then one
must also acknowledge that gangs will have a special attraction
for the residents of those communities, and will pose a special
threat to their future. Moreover, the underclass thesis suggests
that contemporary gangs may be more entrenched than the urban gangs of previous eras, since the relative opportunities for
'"
See BuRsms&
GRASMXcK, supra note 61, at 52-59; SoGAN, note 19, at 65-84, 17279; see also Susan W. Hillenbrand & Robert C. Davis, Residents' PerceptionsofDrugActiity, Crime and Neighborhood Satisfaction, in DRUGS AND THE COMMUNrny, supra note 117,
at 5-18.
I, For this tripartite division of sociological theories of gang formation, see
Brownfield et al., supra note 125, at 11-13. As should be apparent from the discussion
above, from the standpoint of law enforcement it ultimately matters little what relative importance is afforded to each type of theory; as long as gangs are seen as an attractive alternative to the limited opportunity systems in the inner city, all three types
of theories suggest that gang formation will be stimulated. Indeed, to my eye, strain.
social control and social learning theories appear to complement more than compete
with each other, as I suggested earlier. See supra note 80. For a particularly incisive
discussion of the interrelationship between supposedly competing theories of gang
formation, see J. Mitchell Miller & Albert Cohen, Gang Thearres and Their Policy Implications, in GANGS: A CRMMIA1JUSTcE APPROACH 3-16 U. Mitchell Miller &Jeffrey D.
Rush eds., 1996).
"' For a discussion of recent research into the many factors at work in the decision
of a youthful offender to turn to crime, see Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpabihty in
Adolescent Crime,6 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y& L. 507 (1999).
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economic advancement open to low-skill workers and the exposure of youth in underclass neighborhoods to middle-class values appears even more circumscribed now than during much of
the twentieth century.
Because the underclass faces special economic disadvantages, underclass theorists properly argue that special efforts
must be made to increase the educational and economic opportunities available to residents of those communities-advocating
a sort of New Deal for the inner cities. 32 While I am myself in
considerable sympathy with that approach, the case that has
been made for it to date is at best incomplete. The advocates
for greater social spending in the inner city all too often fail to
come to grips with the need for enhanced policing as part of an
effort to revitalize the inner city. The success of any social program, especially in communities rightly skeptical about the willingness of society to give them a fair chance at advancement,
will be necessarily impaired as long as illegitimate economic opportunities remain abundant. 3 Elementary economics dictates
this conclusion-to the extent that illegitimate opportunities for
advancement remain available, the relative attractiveness of
whatever legitimate opportunities that are available, particularly
for those skeptical about those opportunities, is diminished.
Indeed, studies of anti-gang programs consistently show that
those programs that combine social services with increased enforcement initiatives enjoy the most success. 34 Ultimately, then,
the case for using the criminal law to achieve gang suppression
should be particularly compelling for those who are persuaded
by the view that poverty is the most potent criminogenic force in
the inner city.' "

That, for example, is Wilson's view.

See WILSON, supra note 85, at 207-35;

WILSON, supranote 23, at 149-63.
'" To take but one example, gang members are disproportionately likely to drop
out of school. See CURRY& DECKER, supranote 25, at 129-32.
' See, e.g., JAMES C. HOWELL & DEBRA K. GLEASON, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIcE, Yotm-IT
GANG DRUG TRAFFICKING 9 (Dec. 1999); IRVING SPERGEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
GANG SUPPRESSION AND INTERVENTION: PROBLEM AND RESPONSE: RESEARCH SUMMARY 15-

18 (Oct. 1994); Barbara E. Smith & Robert C. Davis, Successful Community Anticrime
Programs: What Makes Them Work?, in DRUGS AND THE COMMUNITY, supra note 117, at
123-37. Conversely, there is little evidence that social intervention programs alone
successfully suppress gang crime. See COVEY, MENARD & FRANZESE, supra note 25, at

272-300.
" To be fair, there are two conceivable alternatives for addressing problems that
would not require an emphasis on gang suppression. The first is legalization of
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Accordingly, an efficacious gang suppression strategy must
minimize the attraction of street gangs for the residents of underclass communities. Since the available research suggests that
the economic incentives underlying gang crime are particularly
potent, mitigating those incentives should be a centerpiece of
gang suppression strategy.'? That, in turn, requires more dedrugs. Legalization would reduce the economic opportunities available to gangs
through drug trafficking, although it would pose a host of other problems. See, e.g.,
James A. Inciardi & Duane C. McBride, The Case Against Legal..ation, in THE DRUG
LEGALIZATION DEBATE 45-79 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1991); Mark H. Moore, Dnigs: Getting a Fix on the Problem and the Solution, 8 YALE L. & POL'v REx. 8 (1990). Moreover, on
the view that it is poverty that breeds inner-city crime advanced here, legalization of
drugs would not so much reduce crime as encourage other forms of economically
motivated criminal behavior that may well lead to even greater social costs than drug
crime. Legalization, in any event, is far too unpopular to be a politically practicable
option. In its 1999 survey, the NORC found that legalization of marijuana .as supported by only 28 percent of respondents and opposed by 69 percent. See 1999
SOURCBOOE, supranote 60, at 149 tbl. 2.81. The second option is resettlement of inner-city minority residents in middle class communities through a scattered-site program that would disperse groups that otherwise might cohere into gangs. This is the
logical implication of Massey and Denton's work, for example. But, as even those
sympathetic to Massey and Denton have observed, given the limited means of the minority underclass, it will be impossible to effectively integrate it into middle class
communities without a massive subsidy, as well as the enactment of laws requiring
relatively wealthy nonminority communities to accept affordable housing for minorities. See, e.g., Florence Wagman Roisman, Book Review: The Lessons of Amencan Apartheid: The Necessity and Means of PromotingResidential RacialIntegration, 81 IOwA L REV.
479, 512-25 (1995). And the likelihood that the massive subsidies and new las necessary to relocate inner-city minorities will be provided by the federal or state governments is surely minimal, however desirable such a policy might be. See, e.g.,
Edward A. Zelinsky, Book Review: Metropolitanism, Progressaism,and Race, 98 COLUlm. L
REv. 665 (1998). Indeed, even Massey and Denton seem to acknowledge the limited
range of options currently within the ambit of political practicability, since their own
policy recommendations are relatively modest, involving improved enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws. SeeMAssEY& DENTON, supranote 102, at 229-36.
" I am perhaps more skeptical than some about the ability of government to address the noneconomic factors that make gang membership attractive in many communities, though I recognize the need to make the attempt. Surely even advocates of
this approach, however, must acknowledge its limitations. In underclass communities
facing potent barriers to upward mobility-barriers that many residents rightly see as
illegitimate and racist-it is understandably difficult to convince residents that they
have a fair opportunity for economic advancement by legitimate means. Wilson's
work, for example, demonstrates this difficulty. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. The emerging scholarship on social norms and law enforcement has yet to
come to grips with Cloward and Ohlin's basic insight that when discrete and coherent
groups come to see prevailing social norms as illegitimate, those norms ill not restrain their conduct. Social norms research itself tends to confirm this point. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L RE'. 1537, 1556-67
And as Professor Harcourt rightly observes, the advocates of order(2000).
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tailed consideration of gang drug trafficking, since it is the
principal type of economically motivated crime associated with
street gangs. And, as we will see, drug trafficking holds special
advantages for gangs when compared to other types of crime.
III. GANGS AND THE ECOLOGY OF INNER-CITY DRUG TRAFFICKING
It is not difficult to imagine how a rational gang wishing to
maximize its drug profits would organize itself. Because drug
buyers lack reliable pricing information, drug sellers should be
able to charge higher prices than they would obtain in a perfectly competitive market. Prices can rise even higher if a gang
can exclude competition from a given market. That can be
done by identifying and then monopolizing a territory that can
operate as a drug market-preferably a lucrative one where demand is high-through the use of coercive tactics against potential competitors. That is pretty much how successful gangs
operate.
Gangs begin with a particular advantage in establishing territorial monopolies, since they are frequently organized around
an identifiable geographic territory.'m The ethnographic work
confirms that, within their territory, gangs attempt to control
drug trafficking in order to increase profits.3 9 John Hagedorn
provides an example from Chicago: "gangs carved out turf in
large high-rise housing projects, where a small organized group
could control drug sales and reap enormous profits simply by
controlling the housing project elevators by armed force." Of
maintenance policing as a means of influencing social norms have yet to identify
compelling empirical evidence to support their claims. See Bernard E. Harcourt, After
the "SocialMeaning Turn": Implicationsfor Research Design and Methods of Proofin Contemporary CriminalLaw Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 179, 191-97 (2000); Harcourt,
supra note 5, at 308-39.
13 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 87-89; SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 109-13;
TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 6-7; VALDEZ, supra note 44, at 25, 29, 66-67, 119-24; Fagan,
supra note 37, at 41.
'" See, e.g., DECKER & VAN WINKLE, supra note 45, at 163-64; KINNEAR, supa note
113, at 17-18; PADiLA, supra note 45, at 16; SPERGEL, supra note 30, at 47-49; Ansley
Hamid, The PoliticalEconomy of Crack-Related Violence, 17 CoNTE P. DRUG PROBS. 31, 61-

63 (1990); Venkatesh, supra note 110, at 247-50. And Levitt and Venkatesh found
evidence that the drug-trafficking gang they studied increased its market power as the
turf it controlled expanded. See Levitt & Venkatesh, supra note 105, at 781-82.
" HAGEDORN, supra note 45, at 104. Similarly, in his study of Milwaukee gangs,
Hagedorn found: "The degree to which drug markets were 'closed' (only gang members were allowed to sell drugs in the neighborhood) also helped stabilize the drug-
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course, not all turf is created equal. Most lucrative are those areas relatively accessible to affluent outsiders; one of the few
studies to examine this issue, Hagedorn's study of Milwaukee
gangs, found that the most important factor stimulating the
growth of gang drug trafficking was whether a gang operated in
an area readily accessible to and frequented by drug buyers
from relatively wealthier areas."' This makes eminent sense;
drug dealing would not be terribly lucrative if it did no more
than attract the money already in disadvantaged neighborhoods-neighborhoods that have little enough of money to begin with.
Gangs thus take on an entrepreneurial character; indeed,
they are forced to do so by the imperatives of the market, just
like any other business. In time, the more successful gangs
prosper while the less successful die, as the ethnographic work
shows. 4 2 The structure of a street gang is well-suited to success

in the drug business, precisely because the gang provides a potent means by which monopoly power over identifiable turf can
be achieved. Skolnick, Bluthenal and Correl, in their study of
Southern California gangs, make the point:
[B]eing a member of gang facilitated drug dealing success. This facilitation was apparent in myriad ways. Gangs, for example, offer a rich
source of shared marketing information. Information about who sells,
for what price, and who has drugs available is frequently communicated
along gang lines. The gang member can also rely on his homeboys for
protection and concerted retribution if anything should happen to him
inside or outside his gang turf. Gang members, furthermore, enjoy easy
access to and control of territorial markets. They can sell drugs in their
own neighborhood without intruding on the turf of others. In return,
they can exclude others from selling on their turf. This territorial monopoly is backed by force since the gang automatically protects against
outside intruders. Finally, there is a well-developed and virtually sacrosanct sense of trust inhering in the homeboy relationship, so that gang

selling environment, thereby increasing drug profits." John Hagedorn, Neighborhoods,
Markets, and GangDrug Organization,31 J. RES. CRME& DEuINQ. 264, 275 (1994).

See id. at 264, 275, 279, 287-88.
For example, this was the pattern observed by Hagedorn in his study of largely
African-American gangs in Milwaukee. See id.at 274-75, 290. Similarly, in his study of
a Puerto Rican gang in Chicago, Padilla concluded that the gang owed its success to
its entrepreneurial organization centered on drug trafficking. See PADILLA%-, supra note
45, at 95-116. This is in fact the general pattern observed among drug trafficking organizations, which become more centralized and entrepreneurial over time as they
face competition. See, e.g.,Johnson et al., supranote 118, at 33-39.
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members
are expected not to betray other members to the police or rival
143
gangs.

The importance of controlling identifiable turf is enhanced
by the fact that drug sales are frequently conducted outdoors, in
open-air markets. The best data on this point currently available, a United States Department ofJustice survey of arrestees in
six large cities, found that the vast majority of crack and heroin
purchases are made outdoors, with powder cocaine somewhat
less likely to be purchased outside.' ' At first blush this may
seem puzzling; one would think that persons engaged in unlawful activities would prefer to do so indoors, away from prying
eyes, and not where they are especially vulnerable to surveillance and arrest. But once again there is an entrepreneurial
explanation. Visible drug markets are easy for potential customers to find, and aside from customers' preference, those involved in illegal transactions may be distrustful of indoor drug
houses, where they lack mobility and are relatively more vulnerable to robbery or police raid.
This is especially true when
drug markets cater to relatively affluent outsiders, who are likely
to be unfamiliar with disadvantaged neighborhoods and unable
or unwilling to look for covert drug distribution centers. Even
where drugs are sold indoors, traffickers will still require lookouts to be posted outside to warn46 of police activity, again, requiring the visible control of turf.1
"' Skolnick et al., supra note 45, at 199 (footnote omitted). The available research
does not show that all gangs are as well organized as those studied by Skolnick, Bilthenal and Correl, or, for that matter, the well-organized gangs described in the other
research I have cited. In fact, research discloses that many gangs are relatively loosely
organized and accordingly much less efficient as drug-selling organizations. See
CURRY & DECKER, supranote 25, at 84-93. Indeed "drug gangs" appear to be a subset
of all street gangs. See HOWELL & DECKER, supra note 45, at 3. The point is not that
gangs are invariably efficient drug-selling monopolists, but that the most successful
gangs adopt these characteristics. It is these gangs that provide the most attractive alternatives to the limited legitimate opportunities available in the inner city, and that
therefore pose the greatest threat to its stability and future.
" See K. JACK RILEY, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRACK, POWDER COCAINE AND HEROIN:
DRUG PURCHASE AND USE PATTERNS IN SIX U.S. CITIES 16-17 (Dec. 1997).

"' See, e.g., TERRY WILLUAMS, THE COCAINE KIDS: THE INSIDE STORY OF A TEENAGE

DRUG RING 46-47 (1989); Hamid, supra note 139, at 63.
"'This account is consistent with a general theory of illicit markets developed by
John Eck, who has postulated that in order to increase revenues over what can be
garnered by engaging in transactions with only those who can be trusted because of
their involvement in local social networks, drug dealers will establish well-known mar-
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The phenomenon of open-air drug markets, as well as the
necessity to post lookouts, requires gangs to be able to thoroughly intimidate the law-abiding residents of their neighborhoods, in order to ensure that they will refrain from informing
the authorities of drug trafficking in the neighborhood. This
imperative of intimidation is perhaps the leading reason why
conventional criminal laws are so difficult to enforce against
gangs. The drug trafficking laws, as well as laws targeting gang
intimidation and harassment, are enormously difficult to enforce if witnesses are too scared to testify."17 Although the academic literature evinces little awareness of this problem, it is
terrifically difficult to convince witnesses to testify a~ainst gang
members, given the prevalence of gang intimidation.
The structure of drug markets also explains quite a bit
about the causes of gang violence. Researchers have found no
consistent relationship between gang activity and violence, nor
between drug trafficking and violence."0 The entrepreneurial
character of gangs explains this phenomenon. If a gang can establish a stable monopoly over relatively lucrative turf, it will do
what it can to discourage violence, which is only likely to draw
the attention of the authorities and ultimately depress revenue.'50 Gang truces are often motivated by this objective; truces
can end a costly dispute by establishing a stable market allocaketplaces where buyers can expect to find sellers whom they come to trust through
repeated transactions. SeeJohn E. Eck, A General Model of the Geography of Illicit Retail
Marketplaces, in CRtmm AND PLACE 74-77 (John E. Eck & David Weisburd eds., 1995).
" Undercover operations, such as drug purchases by undercover police officers,
can be used against many kinds of gang activity even in the absence of civilian witnesses willing to testify, but they present their own problems, considered below.
' SeeVADEZ, supranote 44, at 19-20;Johnson et al., supranote 118, at 35-37.
See, e.g., HowELL & DECKER, supra note 45, at 5; HOWELL, supra note 36. at 11-12.
One study based on interviews of admitted drug sellers in New York City, however,
did find a significantly higher level of violence among those who sold drugs as part of
a larger organization than those who sold outside of any formal or informal structure.
SeeJeffrey Fagan & Ko-lin Chin, Violence as Regulation and Social Control in the Distribution of Crack, in DRUGS AND VIOLENCE: CAUSES, CORRELATES, AND CONSEQUENCES 25-28
(Mario De La Rosa, Elizabeth Y. Lambert & Bernard Gropper eds., 1990).
1WFor example, Levitt and Venkatesh found that inter-gang violence adversely affected gang revenues, because drug buyers become afraid to patronize gangcontrolled drug markets, and because the wages that gangs must pay to their soldiers
rise. See Levitt & Venkatesh, supra note 105, at 775-80. See also MOORE, supra note 40,
at 66-67. Professors Blumstein and Rosenfeld speculate that one of the causes of the
decline in homicide rates in the 1990s was the increasing stability of maturing crack
markets. See Alfred Blumstein & Richard Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends in U.S.
Homicide Rates, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRmiNOLOGY 1175, 1208-10 (1998).
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tion. But when competitors cannot agree on who will control
lucrative turf or when intra-gang disputes over who will control
narcotics or other illicit revenues arise, violence is frequently
the means to resolve the dispute.
Academic research, for example, has found a close relationship between disputes over turf or similar gang prerogatives and
violence. 5 ' That view that is also widespread among law enforcement officials. 52 The enormous increase in violence that
accompanied the entry of crack cocaine into urban markets in
the mid-1980s illustrates this point as well; violence followed
when drug-trafficking organizations competed in order to exploit a new drug which, by virtue of its unusually low price, creRigorous
ated a host of new marketing opportunities. 53
empirical work in this area is rare and difficult to perform, but
one of the best such analyses is of gang-related homicide in Chicago, and it supports the view advanced here. An analysis of
homicide data from 1965 to 1990, subsequently updated with
data through 1994, found that gang-related homicides were
more closely related to areas in which turf was under dispute
than any other factor, including the incidence of drug traffick-

See, e.g., Drugs in the 1990s: Emerging Trends: The Challenges Facing the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Justice Department,and the Coast Guard: HearingBefore the Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture Comm. of the House Comm. on Govt.
Operations, 103rd Cong., 21-23 (May 25, 1994) (statement of Mark Kleiman); HOWELL
& DECKER, supra note 45, at 6-7;JANKowsm, supra note 45, at 161-62; SANDERS, supra
note 40, at 83; VENKATESH, supra note 59, at 110-11; Scott H. Decker, Collective and
Normative Featuresof Gang Violence, 13JUSTICE Q. 243 (1996); Scott H. Decker & Barrik
Van Winkle, "Slinging Dope:" The Role of Gangs and Gang Members in Drug Sales, 11

JuSTIcE Q. 583 (1994); Fagan, Social Organization, supra note 45, at 648-52; Paul J.
Goldstein et al., Crack and Homicide in New York City 1988: A Conceptually Based Event

Analysis, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG ISSUES 651 (1989); Johnson et al., supra note 118, at 3738; Skolnick et al., supra note 45, at 21-23. For an ethnographic account of turf disputes leading to violence at a public housing project in Chicago, see Venkatesh, supra
note 110, at 243-54. Conversely, Venkatesh found that efforts to mediate gang disputes assisted the entrepreneurial activities of gangs, such as drug trafficking. See
VENKATESH, supra note 59, at 223-37.
,' See, e.g., Gangs: A National Crisis: Hearingon S.54 Before the Senate Comm. on theJu-

diciay, 105th Cong. 12-13 (1997) (statement of Steven R. Wiley, Chief of Violent
Crime and Major Offender Section, FBI); The GangProblem in America: Formulatingan
Effective Federal Response: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Juv. Just. of the Senate Comm. on

theJudiciary, 103rd Cong. 14-15 (1994) (statement ofJames C. Frier, Deputy Ass't Dir.,
FBI).
,' See Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-DrugIndustry, 86J. CRIM.

L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995). See also Fagan & Chin, supra note 149, at 28-37.
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ing.'" Carl Taylor, in his ethnographic study of Detroit gangs,
reached a similar conclusion:
Gangs defend their territories in order to protect their narcotic
business. The word is out on the street to everyone: "This is gang territory-stay away." Each street corner, dopehouse, salesperson, distributor,
or customer is part of the territory. Anyone who attempts to enter the
territory becomes the invader, the intruder, the enemy. Unlike the legitimate business world, gangs use physical violence as their only enforcement tool to stop competition and opposition. All gang types in
this study respect the conditions of territorial law and the necessity that
it generates for punishment.

4 ILL. CRI.JuSTICE INr. AUTH., supra note 24, at 10-20. See aLso, CQtOLYN7 REBECC.
G.Ac
BLOCK & RICHARD BLOCK, U.S. DEP'T oF JuSTncE, REsEARCtH IN BRrR STR

CGImiIN C-IICAO 2-4, 8 (Dec. 1993). The authors of the study concluded:
In general, the street gang situations that are potentially most lethal are those of escalating turf battles where gangs are battling over territorial boundaries. In Chicago and
Los Angeles, these traditional turf-based gangs tend to be Latino or non-Launo white, and
the most violent tend to be the smaller gangs that control only a few, strongly defended
blocks. As we have seen, these are the street gangs that specialize in violence. Street gangs
specializing in drug offenses (entrepreneurial gangs) tend to downplay and discourage violence because it is bad for business. Despite this general pattern, however. entrepreneurial
gangs can still be responsible for periodic spurts of lethal and non-lethal violence, when
there is a conflict over control of the drug market.
ILL. GRIM. JuSTICE INF.AuTH, supra note 24, at 20. Levitt and Venkatesh also found
that drive-by shootings on a rival gang's turf are a useful means of scaring drug customers away from that turf and thereby shifting demand to drug markets that the
gang controls. See Levitt &Venkatesh, supra note 105, at 782-83.
"' TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 6. I do not mean to suggest that the only significant
contributing factor to gang violence is the existence of turf disputes. Of course, many
factors contribute to gang violence. For example, one generalization made frequently by both law enforcement and gang researchers is that Hispanic gangs tend to
be more turf-oriented and violent, while African-American gangs are more entrepreneurial. SeM e.g., HOWELL, supra note 36, at 3. The explanation for this may lie in the
deep identification that many Hispanics have with particular neighborhoods, asJoan
Moore has explained. See MOORE, supra note 45, at 35-42, 268-75. See alsojerome H.
Skolnick et al., The Social Structure of Street DrugDealing,9 AM.J. PoLIcE 1. 4-5 (1990)
(distinguishing between "cultural" gangs originally organized around a neighborhood and "entrepreneurial" gangs organized around financial objectives). Conversely,John Hagedorn has suggested that one byproduct of school desegregation in
many cities has been to make African-American gangs less turf-oriented and more entrepreneurial, since busing to achieve desegregation forced African-American gangs
to recruit from a wider variety of neighborhoods. See HAGEDORN, supra note 45, at
135-38. And as Levitt and Venkatesh add, intergang violence also frequently stems
from the individual act of a particular gang member interested in moving up in the
gang's hierarchy, which induces a rival gang to retaliate. See Levitt & Venkatesh, supra
note 105, at 781.
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The need to maintain control over turf-both as a means of
staffing drug distribution locations and to identify and retaliate
against competitors-is why loitering is so important to gangs.
Perhaps the best description of this process is found in Felix Padilla's ethnographic study of a Puerto Rican gang in Chicago, in
which he found that gang members are required to "hang out,"
primarily to prevent rival groups from taking over their turf, but
also because their time spent hanging out on the street block or
corner determines the earning power of the organization. "
When gang members did not "hang out" they were disciplined,
usually beaten.
Padilla also reported that "labor relations" issues in the gang centered around the process of hanging out on
the street. For example, gang members engaged in a form of
work stoppage by refusing to hang out when they had a grievance with their superiors in the gang.58 Hanging out also facilitates gang recruitment. In his study of barrio gangs in southern
California, James Diego Vigil found that the younger children
that hang out on street corners with gang members typically become members themselves. 9 And in one of the few studies of
its kind, Curry and Spergel found that for both AfricanAmerican and Hispanic youth in Chicago, hanging out in places
where drug distributors are found was a statistically significant
predictor of gang involvement; this was the only factor they were
able to identify that accurately predicted gang involvement for
both African-Americans and Hispanics.' 6
In short, gangs are strongest when they can establish stable
monopolies over lucrative drug-trafficking turf. This requires
them to post gang members on that turf in order to sell drugs
and to protect the turf from rivals. What gang members who
are hanging out in order to protect turf and sell drugs appear to
be doing-at least when the police come on the scene-is loitering. If they can loiter with impunity, the arrival of uniformed
police will put no real dent into their organization. Although
drug sales must temporarily cease while the police are present,

" See PADIL.A, supra note 45, at 176-77.
'" See id. at 177.
''
See id.at 176-77.
''
SeeVIGIL, supra note 109, at 48-53. See also CuRRY & DECKER, supra note 25, at 6263; MOORE, supra note 40, at 47-48.
" See G. David Curry & Irving A. Spergel, GangInvolvement and Delinquency Among
Hispanicand African-American Adolescent Males, 29J. RES. CRIME & DEUNQ. 273 (1992).
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by loitering gang members can still control their turf. Of
course, drug sales can resume when the police leave.
This survey of the ecology of inner-city drug trafficking suggests the efficacy of a gang suppression strategy targeting loitering. A focus on suppressing drug trafficking is suggested by the
strong theoretical and empirical case that economic crime-especially crime that can attract money from relatively affluent
outsiders-is a powerful stimulant to gang formation. A focus
on loitering is suggested by the need to undermine the ability of
gangs to maximize their advantage in drug markets. When the
police can disperse loiterers, gangs cannot reliably staff the locations at which their customers expect to be able to find and buy
drugs, nor count on the efficacy of lookouts who can identify
both police activity and potential competitors. ' " This is a particular problem for gangs selling to customers from other,
wealthier neighborhoods who are not likely to be intimately familiar with either gang members or their neighborhoods. '
Students of drug enforcement agree that crackdowns on drug
hot spots designed to make it more difficult and risky for drug
dealers to remain easily accessible to their buyers are a particularly effective means for disrupting drug markets.'o That is ex"' See, e.g., Eck, supra note 146, at 76. This is also why an anti-loitering strategy is
not likely to merely move drug trafficking to different locations when traffickers are
selling outside of their own social networks. As Professor Eck has explained:
[l]n contrast to retail illicit markets using a network solution, those using a routine activities solution will show evidence of high place attachment. Sellers will try to stay at specific
places and, if required to move, will try to limit the distance they move. High place attachment will occur both for security and access reasons. Displacement will be much more
limited. When spatial displacement occurs it uill be restricted to the high routine activity
area and to places within this area that are suitable for selling the goods or services in question (i.e., locations that allow customers to find the place and that provide reasonable security).
Id.
IC

To be sure, neighborhood addicts are always going to be able to find someone

to sell them drugs, but from the standpoint of gangs, what makes drug markets particularly lucrative is their ability to attract relatively affluent outsiders, and it is their
access to drugs that is most likely to be impaired by an anti-loitering strategy. Even
for habitual drug users, as Mark Moore has observed, empirical data increasingly suggests that drug enforcement policy is most effective when it "create[s] an environment in which it is difficult and inconvenient for potential users to acquire drugs, and
in which life for experienced users is sufficiently uncomfortable that they are motivated to seek treatment." Moore, supra note 135, at 33 (footnote omitted).
'0 See, e.g., Robert E. Worden, Timothy S. Bynum &James Frank, Police Crackdowns
on Drug Abuse and Drug Traflicking, in DRUGS AND CRIME: EVALUATING PUBLIC POLICY
INrTumES 95, 100-10 (Doris Layton MacKenzie & Craig D. Uchida eds., 1994): David
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actly what an anti-loitering strategy can achieve. And without
stable and lucrative drug-trafficking monopolies, the appeal of
gang membership is concomitantly reduced.'"
Making drug
trafficking less profitable, in turn, can create real problems for
gangs. The available evidence suggests that the wages of gang
foot soldiers are not much higher than those in the legitimate
market."" Hence, even modest reductions in gang revenues
could critically alter the financial incentives to join gangs.
One might think that a strategy that makes it harder to develop and maintain stable drug monopolies over identifiable
turf would increase gang violence in light of the view advanced
here that gang violence is a product of turf disputes between
M. Kennedy, PullingLevers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Thery of Prevention, 31 VAL. U.L. REV. 449, 470-72 (1997); Mark A.R. Kleiman & Kerry D. Smith, State
and Local DrugEnforcement: In Search of a Strategy, in DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 118,
at 78-90; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the DrugEnforcement Dilemma: Lessons from Economics, 1994 U. Cm. LEG. F. 207, 232-35 (1994). See generally Mark H. Moore, Policies
To Achieve Discriminationon the Effective Price of Heroin,63 AMER. ECON. REV. 270, 271-77
(1973). As Professor Kleiman has explained, when speaking of inner-city open air
drug markets predominantly patronized by suburban drug buyers (whom he calls
"suburban drive-throughs"):
The suburban drive-throughs disproportionately depend on open street markets, whose
speed and anonymity appeal to them. Focused market-disruption tactics, aimed at dealers,
users, and the physical and social conditions that support efficient retail dealing, have been
shown capable of driving a wedge between such users and inner city dealing activity. This
focused crackdown approach is quite different in intent and execution from "street
sweeps" of users, dealers, and hangers-on and from the repetitive, undirected use of "buyand-bust" undercover operations. While sweeps and buy-busts are designed to maximize
the number of arrests and convictions, the goal of market disruption is to minimize the
number of completed transactions, using as little enforcement capacity as possible in the
process. Since much of the harm done by dealing to dealers comes from enforcement, this
is an important distinction between market disruption and "sweeps."
Mark A.R Kleiman, Reducing the Prevalence of Cocaine and Heroin Dealing Among Adolescents, 31 VAL. U.L. REv. 551, 554-55 (1997) (footnote omitted).
'"Under an anti-gang loitering law like Chicago's, targeting groups of at least two
persons, it is true that gang members may loiter alone, but that should not unduly
undermine the efficacy of this approach. At most, only a single individual can stand
at a particular location, and that lone person must be responsible for the drugs, the
money, and to act as a lookout. That lone individual is therefore much more vulnerable, both to the police and to rival gangs who may come along. That person is also
more difficult for his superiors to monitor in order to ensure that he is accurately reporting his sales activity to superiors. Finally, when gang members can only loiter
alone, the comradery and excitement of gang life is significantly reduced. In any
event, Chicago's new anti-drug loitering ordinance is applicable even to those who
loiter alone.
16 See BOURGEOIS, supra note 118, at 91-105; PADILLA, supra note 45, at 169-74;
Hagedorn, supra note 45, at 202-04; Levitt & Venkatesh, supra note 105, at 756, 77075.
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competitors. There is, however, little evidence that gang violence increased during the enforcement of the earlier iteration
of the gang-loitering ordinance in Chicago. In 1995, the last
year the ordinance was enforced, and the year in which its enforcement was most widespread (more than half of all arrests
under the ordinance were in 1995), the overall homicide rate in
Chicago dropped 9 percent, but the gang-related homicide rate
dropped 26 percent. Yet in 1996, when the ordinance was not
enforced due to adverse judicial decisions, the overall homicide
rate dropped another 4percent, while the gang-related homicide rate rose 7 percent. '
Of course, these figures are hardly conclusive. Gang-related
homicide statistics are notoriously spiky-a predictable consequence of the fact that gang violence is a function of the magnitude of gang turf disputes that may exist at any given time,
rather than other factors that may be more stable.'6 ' But these
statistics do suggest that whatever impetus to gang violence an
anti-loitering strategy may create would be more than offset by
the reduced friction between and among gangs-and the greater
tactical difficulties in planning a drive-by shooting-when gang
members no longer can occupy identifiable turf by loitering
with impunity at predictable locations. ' "
Another aspect of anti-loitering laws that merits consideration is their impact on what the streetscape looks like. If one
takes Wilson's work seriously, there is a reason to worry about
visible signs of disorder on the streetscape even if there is no di" See City of Chicago, Gang and Narcotic Related Violent Crime: 1993-97, 3-4
(June 1998) (unpublished report on file with the author, hereinafter cited as "Chicago Crime"). In Morales, the Court noted that gang-related homicides in Chicago
declined by 19 percent in the following year, 1997. Se Morales, 527 U.S. at 49 n.7. Yet
gang-related shootings actually rose in 1997; it appears that only the accuracy of the
shooters declined that year. See Chicago Crime. supra, at 7. Professor Harcourt has
found significance in an unpublished analysis by Professors Schulhofer and Aschuler
finding no relationship between the number of gang-loitering arrests in a police district and declines in homicides and aggravated assaults. See Harcourt, supra note 136,
at 192-93. That analysis, however, was based on all homicides and aggravated assaults.
and not gang-related offenses.
'1' SeeHowELL & DECxER, supranote 45, at 5. See also ILL. CRI..JUS'ntcE IN. AutH.,
supranote 24, at 4.
" In fact, Professors Fagan, Zimring and Kim believe that one explanation for the
precipitous decline in homicides in New York City in the 1990s was that more aggressive patrol tactics moved criminal activity indoors, decreasing the opportunities for
conflicts over drug trafficking. SeeJeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homczide in New York
City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88J. CRIN1. L & CRnMINOLOGY, 1277, 1313-16 (1998).
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rect relation between crime and disorder.'9 Wilson stresses that
the significance of the social isolation results when working class
people leave an inner-city neighborhood. 70 Surely no one can
doubt that open and notorious gang and drug activity contributes to this type of social isolation.' 7 ' Of course, no one wants to
raise children in the midst of open drug markets. Anyone who
can afford to move out of neighborhoods afflicted by this type
of overt criminality doubtlessly do so. That, in turn, leads to increasingly isolated underclass communities. If an anti-loitering
law accomplishes no more than to enable the police to chase
gang activity and drug dealing indoors, forcing it to become
more covert, that alone can contribute to community stability.'72
Of course, one does not need public order laws if one's objective is to disrupt drug markets; enforcing conventional drug
laws through mass arrests of dealers would seem to do the trick
even more effectively. Undercover operations are particularly
well suited to that approach, since, as I have explained above,
gangs want to attract relatively wealthier customers from other
neighborhoods and therefore should be willing to sell drugs to
undercover officers.' 73 Whether this is a practical approach

Skepticism about the relationship between crime and disorder, for example, is
the primary basis on which Professor Harcourt questions the efficacy of public order
laws. See Harcourt, supra note 5, at 308-43.
" See supra notes 83-90, and accompanying text.
,7, SeeJack R. Greene & Edward McLaughlin, FacilitatingCommunities Through Police
Work: Drug Problem Solving and Neighborhood Involvement in Philadelphia, in DRUGS AND
THE Com
-tuNY,
supra note 117, at 142. Greene and McLaughlin have explained the
process when the streetscape is taken over by gangs:
[T]he unwatched neighborhood comer will first fall prey to "hanging out" behaviors which
intimidate local residents. As these residents seek to avoid these locations, other minor
and later criminal problems arise. Ultimately, these comers receive no community surveillance at all, and they become "open-air" drug-marketplaces which continue to intimidate
local law-abiding residents. The slippery-slope of the public's abandonment of public
places, according to this approach, ends in drug-infested neighborhoods, unable to reestablish meaningful neighborhood relations which would counteract such negative behaviors.
'" What is more, the process by which police disperse loiterers creates a visible police presence on the streetscape, and that in turn enhances community morale and
community willingness to cooperate with the police on a wide variety of anti-crime efforts. See id. at 151-60.
1"
Undercover operations do pose serious problems from the community's standpoint, however. Undercover operations can succeed only when uniformed police officers are absent from drug markets. What the community sees in such a setting,
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given the magnitude of gang drug trafficking, however, is open
to serious debate. To the extent that the use of undercover operations to clear inner-city neighborhoods of narcotics trafficking relies on long-term incapacitation of drug sellers through
incarceration, even with the massive prison systems that this
country has produced, it is doubtful that the prison capacity exists to absorb the massive increase in incarceration that such a
strategy would require.'

There are equally serious doubts

about the extent to which arrests for drug offenses can create a
meaningful deterrent effect, given the prevalence of that conduct.'" And the likely efficacy of any incapacitation or deterrence strategy is seriously undermined by the fact that even with
the enormous increase in the rate of incapacitation of drug offenders that we have seen over the past two decades, there has
been no discernable impact on the supply or price of illegal
drugs. 76 What is more, the efficacy of undercover operationswhether involving the purchase of drugs or their sale in "reverse
stings"-is considerably circumscribed, because when buyers and
sellers learn that undercover tactics are in use, they also learn to
however, is not an undercover operation, but blatant criminality, which the police
seem unable or unwilling to stop.
,' The most recent statistics available indicate that 22 states and the federal prison
system all operate at more than 100 percent of their capacity. See BUREAU OFJUsTIcE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1999 8 tbl. 11 (Aug. 2000). Overall,
the federal prison system was 32 percent over its capacity, and state prisons were at
one per cent above their highest capacity and 17 percent above their lowest capacity.
See id. at 9. During 1999, of the two states with the greatest gang crime problems,
California was operating at between 194 and 101 percent of prison capacity, and Illinois was between 162 and 138 percent of its capacity. See id. at 8 tbl. 11. Despite falling overall crime rates, prison population continues to increase, up 3.4 percent
between 1998 and 1999. See id. at 3. Indeed, "[s]ince 1990 the number of sentenced
prisoners per 100,000 residents has risen from 292 to 476." Id. at 4.
'" For a useful review of the recent literature expressing skepticism on the utility
of general deterrence, see Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert,91
Nw. L. REV. 453, 458-68 (1997). An analysis of the limited value of deterrence in the
context of drug crime in particular is found in Jeffrey A. Fagan, Do Criminal Sanctiaons
Deter Drug Crimes?, in DRUGS AND CRIME: EVALUATING PUBUC POLICY INMrIATIES (Doris
Layton MacKenzie & Craig D. Uchida eds., 1994). And given that mass arrests of
gang members for street-level drug dealing and similar offenses rarely result in serious sanctions for a substantial proportion of gang membership, the utility of that
sanction as a means of creating general deterrence of gang-related crime is open to
special doubt. See Malcolm W. Klein, Attempting Gang Control By Suppresson: The Mtuse
of Deterrence Principles, in ThE MODERN GANG READER (Malcolm W. Klein, Cheryl L
Maxson &Jody Miller eds., 1995).
" See supranote 120.
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deal only with those whom they know. That, in turn, only makes
existing distribution networks more profitable and entrenched.
It also gives gangs an incentive to warn customers when a "reverse sting" is underway-and given how well gangs understand
their turf, this is a very real problem with that tactic, and one
likely to become worse if it were to become commonplace. Undercover operations also take uniformed officers off the street,
which can itself promote instability. It is reasonable to believe,
in short, that if undercover operations were a panacea, we
would have discovered that fact long ago. But even putting
aside these doubts, what should be especially troubling about reliance on undercover tactics as a means of ridding the streets of
open drug trafficking are the consequences of that approach
from the standpoint of racial fairness.
are incarcerated at far greater rates
minorities
Inthan
general, ...
77
This racial skewing is most dramatic,
than nonminorites.
however, when it comes to drug crimes. The most recent data
available indicates that African-Americans comprise 56 percent
of those convicted of drug trafficking offenses and 49 percent of
those convicted of drug possession offenses in state courts. 78
Among the federal prisoners convicted of drug offenses, 44.779
percent are African-American and 31.6 percent are Hispanic.
According to the Department of Justice's prisoner population
statistics for 1999, among prisoners in state facilities for drug offenses, 134,800 were African-American, 51,700 were Hispanic,
and only 46,300 were white. 8 0

According to another study,

'" The most recent statistics available for incarceration show a huge racial disparity. For example, among males ages 20-24, the number of sentenced prisoners per
100,000 population was 832 for white males, 7,326 for African-American males, and
2,824 for Hispanic males. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 174, at 9 tbl.

14. Statistics on the likelihood of incarceration by race reflect the same gross disparity: based on 1991 rates of incarceration, 28.5 percent of African-American males and
16.0 percent of Hispanic males will be incarcerated during their lifetime, but only 4.4
percent of white males will be incarcerated during their lifetimes. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIE, LIFETIME LIKEUHOOD OF GOING To STATE OR

FEDERAL PRISON 1-3 (Mar. 1997).
''
See BUREAU OFJUSTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIcE, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS, 1996 5 tbl. 5 (May 1999).
'79 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF

FEDERALJUSTICE STATISTICS, 1998 98 tbl. 7.10 (May 2000).
,, See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 174, at 10 tbl. 15. And this racial

disparity continues to grow. From 1990-98, among sentenced prisoners under state
jurisdiction, the number of African-Americans sentenced for drug offenses increased
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while African-Americans represent only 13 percent of drug users, they constitute 74 percent of those who are imprisoned for
drug offenses."" And those sentences have become considerably
harsher in recent years by virtue of the proliferation of federal
and state laws imposing mandatory minimum prison sentences
8
Statistics for juveor sentencing guidelines for drug offenses"'
nile offenders also show similar racial skewing, greater for drug
offenses than any other category."8"
It is difficult to determine whether these statistics reflect
anything that can fairly be called discrimination. Incarceration
rates are at least partly explained by the greater ability of the police to identify inner-city drug traffickers operating in open air
markets than upscale traffickers and buyers who are more likely
to operate in a relatively covert fashion difficult for the police to
target. ' s But even if the huge racial disparity in drug sentencing
cannot be fairly characterized as discriminatory, it should nevertheless be enormously troubling.
No one but the lunatic racist fringe believes that race is
criminogenic; what the research shows is that crime rates are
higher in impoverished and socially disorganized areas, and that
by 25 percent, the number of Hispanics increased by 18 percent, and the number of
whites increased by 12 percent. See id. at 10 tbl. 17.
"' See MARC MAUER & TRACY HUUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLAcx
ArICANS AND THE CRumALJUSTICES-sEt: FIvE YEARS LATER 12 (1995). As a statistical matter, nearly all of the rate at which minorities are disproportionately incarcerated is explained by disproportionate arrests of minorities for drug offenses. See
Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Rzsited, 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 743, 743-745 (1993).
" See, e.g., Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: Tlae IncarcerationAddiction, 40 VILL. L REv. 335, 343-66 (1995); Note, Developments in the Law - Alternatives To
Incarceration, 111 HARV.L. REV. 1863, 1876-88 (1998). For statistical analyses of the
dramatic increases in the proportion of the prison population that consists of drug
offenders over the last 15 years, see BUREAU OF JusncE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP*T OF
JUsTICE, TIm SERVED IN PRISON BY FEDERAL OFFENDERS, 1986-97, 5 (june 1999) (federal
prison population); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1996, 6 (Apr. 1999) (state prison
population). For example, in 1999 prisoners sentenced for drug violations constituted 58 percent of all federal inmates, up from 53 percent in 1990. See BUREAU OF
JUSTIcE STATISTICS, supranote 174, at 12.
In See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP*T OF
JusTcE, MINORITIES IN TmEJUVENIEJusncE SrEM 9, 11 (Dec. 1999).
"4Professors Tonry and Stuntz have persuasively advanced this explanation for the
enormous racial skewing in drug enforcement. See MICHAELTONRY, MALIGN NEGLEcT:
RACE, CRIpME, AND PUNISmffENTIN AMERICA 105-16 (1995); WilliamJ. Stuntz, Race, Class
and Drugs, 98 COLuTM. L REV. 1795, 1819-24 (1998).
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minorities are far more likely to live in areas of concentrated
poverty associated with high crime rates than nonminorities,
and face more potent barriers to upward mobility than nonmiGang research in particular bears out the relationnorities.
ship between inner-city underclass conditions and gang crime. ""
When we incarcerate inner-city residents for drug trafficking,
then, we are, in significant part, sending people to jail because
they have grown up in poverty. Affluent white suburbanites are
simply never put to the tests posed by the economic and social
stresses of the inner city. Nor could anyone fairly doubt that the
disproportionate minority representation among the impoverished inner-city underclass is one of the many continuing consequences of racism. Indeed, as I suggested earlier, underclass
scholarship has persuasively demonstrated that the existence of
a disproportionately minority underclass is in significant part a
consequence of racial discrimination in both housing and employment. 8 7 A strategy that relies on drug trafficking arrests as
the principal tool available to disrupt drug markets, then, will
likely only exacerbate the burdens that the minority community
continues to experience as a consequence of racism."'s And
when we incarcerate minorities for crimes that they commit at
least in part because they have been discriminatorily confined to
socially isolated, underclass neighborhoods, we compound the
sins of racism. That is not to suggest that we should abandon ef' See, e.g.,

KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE

FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 28-

31 (1998); TONRY, supra note 184, at 128-34; Janet L. Lauritsen & RobertJ. Sampson,
Minorities, Crime, and CriminalJustice, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 58,

65-70 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998); RobertJ. Sampson &Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and
Ethnic Disparities in Crime and CriminalJustice in the United States, in ETHNICrIY, CRIME,
AND IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 311, 333-41 (Mi-

chael Tonry ed., 1997). Professor Jackson's study of the relationship between gang
crime and underclass conditions also reaches this conclusion. SeeJackson, supra note
101, at 387-93.
" See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
'"See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
'" Moreover, there are costs to mass incarceration of minorities that go beyond
the punishment of individual offenders. As Professors Meares and Stuntz have importantly observed, the disproportionate incarceration of minorities delegitimizes the
criminal justice system in the eyes of many minorities, and for that reason may ultimately reduce even further the social controls that inhibit crime. See Tracey L.
Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669, 680-84 (1998); Stuntz, supra note
184, at 1825-32. Professor Cole appears to share this concern. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
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forts to curb inner-city lawlessness-that too would compound
the sins of racism-but it is to suggest that the demands of racial
justice argue for considering tactics that stop short of mass incarceration of inner-city minorities.
Thus, in my view, the use of public order laws is ultimately
justified in terms of raciajustice. If underclass minority neighborhoods are not to be simply abandoned to the tender mercies
of street gangs, something must be done to limit the power of
those gangs. Using public order laws to chase gangs off the turf
that is their lifeblood represents the most feasible step in this direction short of a mass incarceration strategy. I do not minimize the trauma that accompanies a custodial arrest, even on a
misdemeanor public-order charge.)9 And in order to reclaim
particularly lucrative turf, the police may well have to make repeated loitering arrests of the same person-in effect threatening drug dealers with the specter of "doing life in prison one
night at a time" (a formulation that a police commander once
commended to me). But surely the prospect of even repeated
misdemeanor arrests pales in comparison to the burdens imposed on inner-city minorities through a mass incarceration
strategy. However disagreeable a night in jail before bonding
out on a misdemeanor charge is, the consequences of conviction and incarceration on felony drug trafficking charges, especially in this era of mandatory minimum sentencing, are far
more onerous. And in light of the research suggesting that
prison sentences increase the risk of recidivism, there is even
greater reason for the criminal justice system to move toward
less onerous sanctions.9
My aim here is not only to defend anti-loitering laws, but to
suggest that they represent an approach that should be particularly attractive to those who believe that poverty and racism are
at the root of inner-city crime. The view that poverty is powerfully crininogenic and that racism explains much inner-city
poverty should not lead to the conclusion that the criminal justice system has no role to play in ameliorating inner-city crime;
as long as crime is profitable and attractive for inner-city residents, it will undermine the efficacy of the other social programs necessary to stabilize and revitalize the inner city.
See Harcourt, supra note 5, at 368-84; see also Roberts, supra note 5, at 815-16.
For a helpful review of the research, see JERONME G. MRILER, SEAR H AND
DESTrOY: AFMCAN-AERICAN MALES INTHE CRIIINALJUSTnCE SYSht 115-25 (1996).
'"
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Accordingly, law enforcement strategy should be based on an
identification of aspects of the ecolog of the inner city that
make crime profitable and attractive. I Aspects of inner-city
ecology that can be considered criminogenic may range from
an absence of working streetlights, which facilitates robbery, to
the ability of gangs to loiter with impunity, which facilitates stable drug markets. 92 But if the case for a policing strategy based
on something other than sheer incapacitation is to be made, its
advocates must be willing to identify and target criminogenic
conditions and behavior. If, conversely, law enforcement does
nothing to address criminogenic conditions because that risks
punishing "innocent" behavior, then punitive regimes will always carry the day. And the risk of punishing "innocent" behavior that is said to attend public order law enforcement brings
me back to the racial critique of the anti-gang loitering ordinance with which I began this article.
IV.

GANG LOITERING AND THE POLICE

It is entirely fair to debate the efficacy of public-order law
enforcement as compared to more conventional police tactics; I
would not argue that compelling empirical evidence is yet available demonstrating the superior efficacy of public-order policing compared to conventional police tactics. 9 But the debate
over whether public order laws unreasonably facilitate police
abuse all too often is played out in only two dimensions-comparing the benefits of those laws to the risk that they will be
used against innocent persons-while ignoring the critical ques1

See, e.g., Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, in BUILDING A SAFER

SOcIETY: STRATEGICAPPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION 101-22 (Michael Tonry

& David

P. Farrington eds., 1995).
' See generallyJuDrrHD. FEINS, JOEL C.

EPSTEIN & REBECCA WIDOM, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOLVING CRIME PROBLEMS IN RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS: COMPREHENSIVE

CHANGES IN DESIGN, MANAGEMENT, AND USE (April 1997). For a particular example of

another anti-gang initiative based on an analysis of the ecology of inner city gangcrime involving the use of traffic barriers to combat drive-by shootings, see JAMES
LASLEY,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

"DESIGNING OUT" GANG HOMICIDES AND

STREET

ASSAULTS (Nov. 1998).

,' Indeed, substantial debate continues over the import of the statistical evidence
generated during the enforcement of Chicago's original anti-gang loitering ordinance. See Harcourt, supra note 136, at 191-94. See also supra note 166. Empirical
study is particularly difficult since, on the view advanced here, the primary benefit of
anti-loitering laws should be in disrupting drug trafficking, and there is no reliable
way to measure the volume of drug trafficking in a given neighborhood.
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tion of how those laws compare with police tactics that would
otherwise be employed. A more complete evaluative framework
for any policing strategy's potential for abuse would consider
not only the likelihood that it will be used against innocent persons, but also the magnitude of the intrusion on personal liberty
that it authorizes, contrasted with the risk of abuse and the
magnitude of the intrusion that inhere in the policing strategy it
would replace. And that requires consideration of conventional
policing tactics.
The police exercise enormous discretion under the Fourth
Amendment standard of "reasonableness" for justifying the "seizure" of a person.1 9 The Supreme Court tells us that "the police
can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if
the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable
facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer
lacks probable cause." 95 The standard for reasonable suspicion,
like the standard for probable cause necessary to justify a fullfledged custodial arrest, leaves ample room for police discretion; the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[a]rticulating
precisely what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean
is not possible."198 The exercise of judgment and discretion
therefore is inevitable as the police apply these standards, since
"[r]easonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon
both the content of information possessed by the police and its
degree of reliability."1 97 And the magnitude of the power that
the police are granted on the basis of "reasonable suspicion" is
substantial. For one thing, the "brief"detention authorized under the reasonable suspicion standard can last at least 20 minutes, and 20 minutes of custody can be a terrifying intrusion.'"
Moreover, the reasonable suspicion standard authorizes not
only detention but physical intrusion as well; the Supreme
Court has permitted the police to conduct "a protective search -

"

See U.S. CONST. amend. LV, § 1.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 390 U.S.

1, 30 (1968)).
'" Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996). See also, e.g., So!,olou, 490
U.S. at 7 ("The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not 'readily,
or even useful, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
'' See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 (1985).
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permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause.... "'99
Of particular relevance to policing in the inner city is the
degree to which courts will grant police even greater leeway in
"high crime areas." As Professor Raymond has observed, courts
frequently permit the police to stop, detain and search individuals based on highly ambiguous conduct merely because that
conduct occurs in what the pgolice can fairly characterize as a
"high crime neighborhood."
That approach was blessed by
the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Wardlow,2 1' when it held that the
Fourth Amendment permitted police to detain an individual
who fled upon their arrival in an area known for drug trafficking. °2 Thus, the Court has effectively granted the police greater
authority to search and seize in many minority neighborhoods
than they have elsewhere. °3 And whatever one thinks of the result in Wardlow, the rule that the Court has endorsed is not going to go away any time soon; on the question whether the
"' Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). Moreover, even the most
minor traffic infraction can authorize the arrest and search of both the driver and vehicle, with the Fourth Amendment proving no obstacle even in the face of a claim
that the traffic violation was a mere pretext. SeeWhren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996). As Professor Livingston has observed, the traffic laws afford at least as much
and perhaps more discretion to police as public order laws. See Livingston, supra note
18, at 172-76.
See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Consideringthe Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 115-24
(1999).
"' 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
See id. at 124-25.
Indeed, in Wardlow the Court acknowledged that its holding, like the general
Fourth Amendment standards governing search and seizure, anticipate that the police will detain and search persons even when the evidence that they are engaged in
misconduct is ambiguous at best. The Court wrote:
Respondent and amici also argue that there are innocent reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity.
This fact is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Even in Teny [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)], the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous
and susceptible of an innocent explanation ....Te77y recognized that the officers could
detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity.
In allowing such detentions, Teny accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent
people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection with more drastic
police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause to believe that they have
committed a crime may turn out to be innocent.

Id. at 125-26. See also Livingston, supra note 18, at 176-79. In Wardlow, the Court also
ignored Justice Stevens' argument that racial minorities have particular reason to fear
police misconduct. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132-35 (StevensJ, dissenting).
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police may consider whether they are in a "high-crime area"
when making judgments about whether to detain individuals,
the Court was unanimous.2
In the absence of rigorous statistical evidence, reasonable
persons will differ on how frequently police use their discretion
to stop and search under conventional laws to engage in racial
profiling--the practice of using race as a basis on which to stop
or detain individuals. But given the ample discretion that the
police are granted by settled Fourth Amendment standards, few
could doubt that a substantial potential for serious abuse is present even under quite ordinary laws, such as traffic regulations.
My own guess is that racial profiling is probably less prevalent
on urban police forces where officers more frequently interact
with people of color than it is elsewhere, but there is no doubt
that the evidence of racial profiling is becoming increasingly potent.2 There is also no doubt that police departments must
struggle with racism in their midst no less than other institutions. Moreover, because a substantial proportion of offenders
that officers encounter are minorities, police daily confront the
temptation to utilize racial stereotypes and generalizations. For
those officers who give into that temptation, conventional law
enforcement tactics grant considerable freedom to unfairly target persons of color. If nothing else, the current debate over
racial profiling in the enforcement of quite conventional laws
vividly illustrates just that point.26
' In dissent, Justice Stevens opined that a suspect's flight from police while in a
high-crime area was not sufficient to justify his seizure, but he did not reject the relevancy of a neighborhood's characteristics to the reasonable-suspicion inquiry. See id.
at 128-29 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
See David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why "Drivnrg While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L REv. 265, 275-88 (1999) (summarizing recent statistical
evidence suggesting that at least some state police departments use race as a basis on
which to make traffic stops). See also BUREAU OF JUSTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DE."T OF
JUSTICE, CONTACrS BEM.EEN POLICE AND THE PUB1IC (March 2001). Moreover, there is
a body of research suggesting that on average police officers perceive minority youth
to be more hostile and threatening than similarly situated non-minorities, and take
enforcement action based on that perception. SeeJohn Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson,
CiminalInequality in America, in CRIE AND INEQUALITY, supranote 98, at 24-28.

See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AmRICAN
CRmfNALJusTicE SYSTEM 16-62 (1998); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THI LX'

136-67 (1997); RUSSELL, supra note 185, at 33-46; AngelaJ. Davis. Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAI L. REv. 425 (1997); David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor leans Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. LJ. 659 (1994); Harris,
supra note 192; Erika L Johnson, "A Menace to Society": The Use of CriminalProfiles and
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Enforcement of conventional laws, accordingly, allows the
police enormous freedom to undertake a variety of quite heavyhanded measures against the residents of inner-city minority
communities, authority that officers who may harbor racial biases are frequently accused of misusing. Chicago-style antiloitering laws that rely on police dispersal orders, in contrast,
are a good deal less heavy-handed than a strategy that relies on
officers stopping, detaining, and searching anyone who appears
suspicious. Indeed, an anti-loitering ordinance targeted in the
manner that Morales requires provides a dramatic example of
limited enforcement discretion.
Under such an ordinance,
both tactics and objectives are sharply circumscribed. An area
can be targeted for enforcement only when the police reasonably believe that loitering in an identifiable area has a harmful
purpose or effect. 20 Moreover, applying the "apparently harmIts Effects on Black Males, 38 How. LJ. 629 (1995); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendmen4 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998); Tracey Maclin, Terry V. Ohio's Fourth
Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1271 (1998);
AdinaJ. Schwartz, "JustTake Away Their Guns": The Hidden Racism ofTerry v. Ohio, 23
FoRDHAm URB. LJ. 317 (1996); Randall S. Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 327 (1994); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the
Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999). Indeed,
statistical evidence suggests that in New York City the reasonable suspicion standard
has facilitated racial profiling under conventional laws. SeeJeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000).
' In this respect, Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance is typical of quality-of-life law
enforcement, which has been accompanied by a substantial effort to develop meaningful limitations on enforcement discretion. See, e.g., GEORGE L. KELUNG, U.S. DEP'T
OFJUSTICE, "BROKEN WINDOWS" AND POucE DISCRETION 33-45 (Oct. 1999). In my view,
this is no accident, but a predictable consequence of police culture. As Professor
Livingston has observed, in recent decades police culture has favored motorized patrol, centralized dispatch systems designed to respond quickly to breaches of the
peace, and investigation of what is thought to be "serious" crimes rather than qualityof-life policing. See Livingston, supra note 12, at 565-68. For that reason, in my experience the police rarely devote substantial efforts to enforcement of public order
laws-laws that they ordinarily believe to be insignificant and lacking the "glamour" of
felony prosecution-without fairly searching inquiries into strategy and tactics.
"' Probable cause is, of course, the standard required by the Fourth Amendment
to support an arrest, and by virtue of that standard the police are subject to at least
some measure ofjudicial oversight. When the police lack probable cause to believe
that loitering has the requisite purpose or effect, they are subject to civil liability in
addition to the exclusion of any evidence derived from the unconstitutional seizure.
See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). Moreover, injunctive relief is available
against systemic police misconduct. See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 811-16
(1974).

2000]

GANG LOITERING AND RACE

ful purpose or effect" standard endorsed in Morales will require
use of officers intimately familiar with their beat, who can supply testimony about the effects that loitering has had in a
neighborhood. 2
And under an anti-loitering ordinance like
Chicago's-requiring disobedience to a dispersal order before
an arrest can be made-the police cannot detain, search, or
even touch loiterers, unless they have disobeyed an order to
move on. DO Few laws give the police less discretion when managing an encounter; and few laws give the civilian more ability
to terminate an unpleasant encounter with the police.2"1' The
' Use of local beat officers to enforce public order laws has its own virtues. Elijah
Anderson, in his ethnographic study of a Philadelphia community in transition, observed that African-Americans in the community drew a distinction between "local"
and "downtown" police, believing that local police develop greater familiarity with local residents and hence are less likely to abuse their authority. Set ANDERSON, supra
note 118, at 199-206. What is more, after the Supreme Court's adoption of the
"harmful purpose or effect" standard in Morales, enforcement of anti-loitering laws
must necessarily be community based and driven. In order to document the harmful
effects of gang loitering, the police will be required, in effect, to map the gang problem. The process of identifying gang "hot spots" necessarily requires the police to develop enforcement strategy jointly with the community.
"'° In my conversations with academics on the anti-gang loitering ordinance, they
frequently express concern about some 42,000 arrests made under the original ordinance, see Morales, 527 U.S. at 49, believing that a number this high must reflect undifferentiated sweeps of inner-city communities. If one considers, however, that the
number of gang members in Chicago is in the six figures, see supra note 29 and accompanying text, and that a single individual may have to be arrested for gang loitering many times before he is dissuaded from hanging out at his assigned drug
trafficking location, the number of arrests that may prove necessary to enforce such
an ordinance is put into its proper context. Even spending 10 or 15 nights in jail is
far less onerous than a conviction and mandatory prison sentence on felony drug
trafficking charges. In any event, under Chicago's new anti-loitering ordinances, the
ratio of arrests to dispersal orders has dropped dramatically, perhaps as a reflection of
improved training and tactics.
2"
Indeed, the risk of misidentifying individuals as gang mcmbers is likely to be
particularly low, since both academic and police sources are in agreement that gang
members are generally willing to identify themselves when questioned. See CUR.RY &
DEcKER, supra note 25, at 6-7. Moreover, one can have some confidence that truly
egregious abuse of public order laws can be readily discovered. Unlike station-house
interrogations, which take place out of public view, or even stop-and-frisk encounters,
in which an officer can claim that he observed something that aroused his suspicion,
if officers use anti-loitering ordinances as a vehicle for mere street sweeping, without
providing fair warning through orders to disperse, that pattern can be easily discovered. Anyone with a video camera-be it an internal affairs officer, a journalist, a local resident, or a civil rights organization-ought to be able to document this
problem. And if officers issue orders to disperse without an) reason to believe that
persons of color are involved in gang or narcotics investigations, testers might be utilized to discern that type of abuse.
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use of the dispersal order is a particularly significant innovation-this approach calls on police to assume an ordermaintenance rather than arrest function in the first instance,
and accordingly encourages police to view their job in terms
other than maximizing the number of searches or arrests that
they perform. 2 And in minority communities where there is
strong support for greater order on the streetscape coupled
with concern about the risk of police abuse, this approach may
substantially enhance support for the police, especially if residents conclude that this approach embodies a type of rough justice by authorizing search or arrest only of those who have
disobeyed a police order-a restraint frequently absent from
other types of law enforcement tactics.
In short, for those concerned about police abuse, a policing
strategy that directs police to warn loiterers to move on before
they are subject to arrest and search fares strikingly well when
considered in terms of the magnitude of the authority that it
confers on the police. To be sure, groups of loiterers containing no one with a gang or drug affiliation may occasionally be
inappropriately or unfairly ordered to disperse, but that inconvenience pales in comparison to being detained, searched, tick-

"' Professor Livingston has observed:
As is now well understood, police serve an order maintenance role that is distinct
from their law enforcement role in two important ways. First, police invoking a public order law in service of order maintenance ends are often less interested in "enforcing the
law" than in "maintaining a pattern of public order" - in putting an end to conditions or
behaviors that threaten the public peace. As a result, many order maintenance problems
are handled on the street and informally, without any need for citation or arrest. Second,
order maintenance, properly performed, is generally less adversarial than the ferreting out
of serious crime. This is partly because the maintenance of public order is often negotiated and thus does not place officers in frankly confrontational relations with people on
the street. In addition, order maintenance does not feed the competitive, "crime fighting"
self-image of many patrol officers.
Because police at least generally expect their commands to be followed, however,
limiting police authority in the first instance to the issuance of a "move along" order lessens the temptation on the part of police to employ a low-level public order law simply to
gain the authority to search. This is a significant advantage. The ferreting out of serious
crime is an intensely competitive enterprise that poses a substantial risk of excessive police
zeal. Order maintenance, properly performed, is altogether different. By partially disentangling police measures that are principally directed at promoting and maintaining public order from the more adversarial business of investigating serious crime, then, the
Chicago ordinance's "move along" feature at least reduced the risk of arbitrary and capricious enforcement.
See Livingston, supranote 18, at 186-87 (footnotes omitted).
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eted, or even arrested.1 Even more important, to the extent
that the police devote their limited resources to dispersal of loiterers, the use of much harsher sanctions will decrease. And for
those who agree that inner-city drug trafficking is itself one of
the legacies of racism, it should be critical to develop strategies
that can revitalize inner-city communities without imposing the
enormous costs that drug-law enforcement all too often impose.
All that said, I cannot deny that the potential for abuse of
public order laws exists.i 4 My point here is not that public or21,

Professor Stuntz has made just this point, writing before the Supreme Court's

decision in Morales:
The essence of the attack, both in Morala and in the many lower court cases that
have preceded it, is vagueness coupled with a fear (always somewhere near the surface in
vagueness doctrine) that the statutes will be used to discriminate against young black men.
The attack gets it backwards. Street stops under anti-gang statutes are best seen as a subsutute for street-level drug stops and arrests, and drug enforcement is already targeted disproportionately toward young men in poor black neighborhoods. That targeting will not
disappear if the anti-gang statutes are struck down. And targeted drug enforcement may
be much worse than enforcement of anti-gang laws and the like, both because drug enforcement tends by its nature to be discriminatory in a way that public order policing need
not be, and because drug enforcement is more likely attended by long prison sentences.
Statutes and ordinances like Chicago's may be one of the best ways for the system to reduce the bias in drug law enforcement-and the huge racial tilt in the prison populationwhile maintaining or increasing the overall level of police protecuon in poor neighborhoods.
SeeStuntz, supra note 184, at 1837 (footnote omitted).
" That is not to suggest that police officers enjoy anything approaching unfettered discretion when enforcing an anti-gang loitering ordinance. Enforcement
standards can also be utilized that meaningfully circumscribe an officer's ability to determine that a loiterer is engaged in gang-related activity. The internal directive of
the Chicago Police Department that governed enforcement of the original gang loitering ordinance, for example, provided:
Probable cause to establish membership in a criminal street gang must be substanuated by the arresting officer's experience and knowledge of the alleged offenders and corroborated by specific, documented and reliable information, such as:
A. The individual's admission of membership.
B. The wearing of distinctive emblems, tattoos, or similar markings indicative of a
specific criminal street gang, but only when such emblems, tattoos, or similar markings
would not reasonably be expected to be displayed by any individual except a member of
that specific criminal street gang, and membership may not be established solely because
an individual is wearing clothing available for sale to the general public.
C. The use of signals or symbols distinctive of a specific criminal street gang.
D. The identification of the individual as a member of a specific criminal street gang
by an individual who:
i. has provided reliable information to the Department in the past or whose information can be independently corroborated; and
ii. alleges that the individual in question is a member of a specific criminal street
gang.
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der laws are immune to abuse, but rather that their critics have
failed to consider the alternative. Equally important, they have
failed to consider why aggressive policing is so frequently undertaken in inner-city minority communities. The explanation is a
good deal more complicated than many of these critics acknowledge. An evaluation of inner-city policing would be at
best incomplete without consideration of the political realities
that confront urban police.
One fundamental reason that aggressive policing in the inner city is here to stay is that its residents want criminality in
their midst to be suppressed. The point that I made earlier
about the demand for greater law enforcement within the minority community cannot be overstressed.2 1 5 The claim that law-

enforcement strategy in this country reflects an effort by a white
majority to subordinate persons of color simply does not reflect
the reality of urban law enforcement. Most residents of innercity neighborhoods, no different in this respect from anyone
else, do not want to live in crime-ridden neighborhoods. 2' 6 And

that provides a useful context in which to evaluate the racial critique of inner-city policing.
Critics of inner-city policing should ponder what it is that
they would have the police do. Consider, for example, the critical race theorists who argue that the criminal justice system
ought to be forbidden to direct its efforts disproportionately
217
There is little reason to believe this view is
against minorities.
widely shared in the inner city; I am unaware of any evidence
suggesting that the minority community itself seeks only a proportionate commitment of law enforcement resources to innercity communities that experience a disproportionate share of
crime. To the contrary, as I suggested earlier, polling evidence
consistently indicates that African-Americans are more con7
See Pet. for Cert., at 6 a-68a, Morales (setting forth Chicago Police Department General Order 92-4, Part V).

..See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
"' Indeed, Professors Bursik and Grasmick argue that a basic element of commu-

nity dynamics is the community's effort to protect itself from crime.

See BURSIK &

GRASMICK, supra note 61, at 15.
.. For example, Paul Butler has advocated a variety of measures making it more
difficult to incarcerate African-Americans, especially for drug crimes. See Paul Butler,
Affirmative Action and the CriminalLaw, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 841 (1997).

advocated jury nullification.

He has also

See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullfication: Black

Power in the CriminalJusticeSystem, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
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cerned about crime than nonminorities.2 8' Whatever qualms
minorities have about law enforcement-and there are qualms
aplenty219 -there is little evidence that they have translated into a
view that the police should reduce their efforts to curb innercity lawlessness.m Residents of gang-ridden communities know
that withdrawing the police from their midst will not revitalize
their communities but would instead make lawbreaking more
profitable and attractive, enhancing its lure for inner-city
youth.2'
And when inner-city minority communities demand an end
to drug and gang activity in their midst, public officials are left
with little choice but to engage in increasingly aggressive polic-

"' See supranote 60.

...For example, polls have consistently shown that concern among AfricanAmericans about police misconduct is significantly higher than among whites. See
1999 SoURc~wOx, supra note 60, at 108 tbl. 2.26, 110 tbls. 2.30 & 2.31. 111 tbls. 2.32,
2.33, 2.34 & 2.35. Polls also show that African-Americans are somewhat more likely
than whites to think that the courts in their communities are too harsh with criminals.
See id. at 130-31 tbl. 2.56. Yet in this regard, one of the few studies to examine the effect of race on community residents' perceptions of the police concluded that negative perceptions of the police were more strongly correlated with a neighborhood's
crime rate than its race. See Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Polidng Residents'Percepthonsr
Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & SOc'REV. 129 (2000).
' Especially pertinent to this point is the racial breakdown of the NORC polls on
legalization of marijuana. In the 1998 poll, 34 percent of whites but only 22 percent
of African-Americans supported legalization of marijuana, while 60 percent of whites
and 71 percent of African-Americans opposed legalization. See 1999 SOURCEBOOF4 supra note 60, at 150-51 tbl. 2.82. African-Americans have opposed legalization of marijuana at greater rates than whites in every one of these annual polls since 1987. See id.
If African-Americans were as troubled by the use of the criminal law to address supposedly "victimless" drug crimes as some critics suggest, one would expect to see
greater support for drug legalization in the African-American community. See generally Tracey L Meares, ChartingRace and ClassDifferences in Attitudes Toward DrugLegalization and Law Enforcement: Lesons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. Ci . L RE%,. 137
(1997).
" Professors Bursik and Grasmick have observed:
[Als many urban analysts have noted, it is very difficult to significantly affect the nature of
neighborhood life through the efforts of local community organizations alone. Rather.
these groups must be able to negotiate effectively with those agencies that make decisions
relating to the investment of resources in the area that may foster the kinds of control that
we have been discussing.... [C]onsideration of the public bases ofsystemic control is crucial to a full understanding of the relationship between neighborhood dynamics and
crime.

BuRsicK & GRAsMIcK, supra note 61, at 38 (citations omitted); see also supra note 134
and accompanying text.
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ing, even though it is likely to target persons of color.2 2 That, in
turn, means that the police will necessarily measure their success by arrest and incarceration rates, and will continue to push
the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment, at least if the only
tools at their disposal are conventional criminal laws. Public
order laws, accordingly, should be welcomed by those who care
about racial justice-they provide the police with a strategy that
does not depend on increasingly aggressive search and seizure,
as well as mass incarceration, in order to disrupt entrenched
criminal networks. And if anti-loitering laws succeed in making
drug trafficking become more covert and less profitable, then
the political pressure that leads to massive undercover operations and equally massive incarceration should abate concomitantly.
Finally, Chicago-style public order laws carry with them a
greater measure of political legitimacy than many of the conventional law enforcement tactics now used in their stead. Conventional drug laws are enacted by state and federal
governments far removed from and at best only marginally accountable to the inner city; and the minority community can
rightly complain that it never consented to a program of antidrug enforcement that falls so heavily and disproportionately
upon it. 2 3 A post-Morales anti-loitering law, in contrast, must be
adopted through open debate in the local political process.
That, in turn, enhances the likelihood that the minority corn' This may well be an example of Gary Sykes' influential theory that policing is
resistant to reform because the community itself demands that the police keep the
peace, and this peacekeeping function requires the police to exercise considerable
discretion in a manner that resists efforts to rationalize, bureaucratize or control police discretion. See Gary Sykes, The FunctionalNature of Police Reform: The 'Myth' of Controllingthe Police 2JusncE Q. 51 (1985).
" New York City's public order policing initiative may well reflect a similar problem. To the extent that it is premised on a desire to maximize the number of
searches the police conduct regardless of compliance with the Fourth Amendmentas Professor Harcourt argues it is, see Harcourt, supra note 5, at 339-42-that too is an
unacknowledged policy never expressly offered for public scrutiny. When the police
execute a policy that was never sanctioned through open political debate, the legitimacy of that tactic is fairly subject to question, even apart from its legality. Indeed,
Professor Harcourt launches an attack on New York City's approach along these lines,
suggesting that the police have endeavored to impose their own norms of orderliness
on the community. See id. at 297, 353-77. See generally Erik Luna, TransparentPolicing,
85 IOWA L. REv. 1108 (2000); Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing,and the Social
Norms Approach To Crime Control. Should One Make Us More Comfortable With the Others?,
34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1282-88 (2000).
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munity will be an active partner in the adoption of these policies. Indeed, given the political influence that the minority
community has come to wield in most urban areas, there is little
reason to believe that its views can be safely ignored by elected
officials in those areas.2 Utilizing the local political process in
this fashion not only adds to legitimacy, but for that reason may
also enhance the efficacy of anti-loitering laws. It is wellaccepted that the extent to which laws are seen as legitimate has
a critical impact on the willingness of people to obey those
laws.2 Employing laws that are both less harsh and adopted
through a process more directly accountable to the minority
community can therefore only enhance legitimacy.
The enormous commitment of public resources directed at
so-called "victimless" drug crimes in minority neighborhoods
should make plain that something more complicated than simply racial subjugation is going on in urban policing-there is in
fact a considerable commitment of law enforcement resources
to the prosecution of crime in the minority community that
does not affect whites in any direct way. The explanation, I have
argued, is a function of urban politics-the inner-city minority
community rightly demands that overt gang and drug criminality in its midst be curbed. In my view, without public order laws,
the best we can realistically hope for is the enormously racially
skewed status quo that conventional drug-law enforcement provides. It would be ironic if those who criticize public order laws
on grounds of racial justice carried the day, only to find that
they have left the police with nothing to offer high-crime, innercity neighborhoods but the prospect of yet more mass incarceration-or more gang-related crime in those neighborhoods.
Inquiry into the ecology of the inner city, in my view, can
teach much about inner-city crime and inner-city policing. Urban sociology tells us that gang criminality is not a figment of
the overactive imaginations of racist police officers. Nor is it reflective of some sort of underclass pathology. It is instead an
In that connection, it is worth noting that of Chicago's nineteen AfricanAmerican aldermen, 14 voted in favor of the newly revised anti-gang and anti-drug
='

loitering ordinance. See Fran Spielman, New Anti-Gang Law Passes; 4 Rip Measure As
Racst, Cm.SuN-Tams, Feb. 17, 2000, at 3.
2
See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEYTHE LAw 19-68 (1990). And legitimacy, in

turn, is in significant part a function of whether those who must obey the law feel that
their voice is heard by the authorities. See id. at 125-57.
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understandable, even rational response when coherent groups
are given good reason to believe that legitimate opportunities
for advancement are denied them. It is naive to think that the
problems of the minority underclass can be solved without suppressing gang crime, which mightily contributes to the profound social isolation that Wilson and others have found afflicts
the inner-city underclass. Critics of inner-city policing are right
to claim that law enforcement tactics that are used disproportionately against minorities imperil the legitimacy of the criminal justice system-especially in the eyes of minorities-but surely
a criminal justice system that is unable to suppress overt lawlessness in poor, disproportionately minority neighborhoods, while
maintaining far greater security and stability in whiter, more affluent areas, is vulnerable to the same attack. Indeed, when the
police are seen as content to let gangs run poor, disproportionately minority neighborhoods, a truly fundamental crisis of legitimacy is the inevitable result. But without public order laws,
there is little one can expect but adherence to the harsh and
punitive regime that the critics of public order laws must acknowledge we already have imposed in the inner city in an effort to combat the serious crime problems it confronts. Public
order laws constitute the best opportunity we are likely to have
to break the power of gangs with something short of mass incarceration. For that reason, they may well be the only credible alternative to the "get-tough" policies increasingly ascendant in
the criminal justice arena, policies that only exacerbate our racial divide. To reject that alternative, leaving in place a harshly
punitive and racially skewed regime, is the counsel of despair.
And surely there has been quite enough of that when it comes
to the plight of the inner cities.

